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TERRIFIED BY TECHNOLOGY: HOW
SYSTEMIC BIAS DISTORTS U.S. LEGAL
AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO
EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
Steve Calandrillo*
Nolan Kobuke Anderson**

"Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood. Now is the
time to understand more, so that we may fear less."
-Marie Curie
Americans are becoming increasinglyaware of the systemic biases we
possess and how those biases preclude us from collectively living out the
true meaning of our national creed. But to fully understandsystemic bias
we must acknowledge that it is pervasive and extends beyond the contexts

ofrace, privilege, andeconomic status. Understandingallforms ofsystemic
bias helps us to better understandourselves and our shortcomings. At first
glance, a human bias against emerging technology caused by systemic risk
misperception might seem uninteresting or unimportant. But this Article
demonstrates how the presence of systemic bias anywhere, even in an area
as unexpected as technology regulation, creates inefficiencies and inequal-

ities that exact heavy costs in the form of human lives, standards of living,
and lost economic opportunities. The decision to regulate or implement an
emerging technology, like any other complex decision, naturally involves
some form of cost-benefit or risk-rewardanalysis. However, in the context
of emerging technology, that analysis is biasedby systemic risk mispercep-

tion. Immutable characteristicsexisting in emerging technology combine
with interrelatedcharacteristicsin human decisionmakers and regulators
to inflate perceptions of risks and depress perceptions of benefits. This artificial shifting of cost-benefit curves results in suboptimal legislative and
regulatoryresponses to emerging technology, and ultimately, in the loss of
American lives.
*
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INTRODUCTION

Technology saves lives.1 Yet our legislative and regulatory responses to
emerging technologies often reflect feelings of trepidation and irrationality rather
than wonder and excitement. Many of us fear new technology. 2 Some even hate
it.3 Why? Examples of technology saving and improving lives are legion but so
are examples of human distrust of technology. What is it about emerging technology that causes us to systematically and consistently misperceive the risk that
it poses to society? Articles and studies dealing with the causes of risk misperception are a dime a dozen, but few have sought to explain how those factors
target emerging technology in an invidious and particularized manner. That is
the task this Article confronts head on.
Our predisposition to oppose new technology stems in part from how our
brains are hardwired. The shortcuts and heuristics that our brains rely on to navigate everyday life can cause us to formulate biases against new technology that
threaten to disturb the status quo.4 Moreover, these heuristics interact with characteristics inherent to emerging technologies to bias us even further. Systemic
technological risk misperception, as we call it, causes us to inflate perceived risks
associated with a given technology and clouds our perceptions of the benefits
that technology promises to offer. In other words, it shifts the perceived cost
curve higher and depresses the perceived benefit curve lower. Because we live
in a democracy with millions of individual decisionmakers, this human bias
against emerging technology inevitably percolates into the highest levels of government. The end product is deadweight loss resulting from suboptimal decisionmaking, legislative and regulatory overreaction, and an accompanying decrease
in social welfare.
This is not an academic problem. Systemic technological risk misperception is deadly. When legislators or regulators restrict or refuse to implement a
piece of technology as a result of risk misperception, we lose the opportunity to
save lives, improve lives, and maintain our position on the world stage as a leader
in technological development. Unfortunately, because the consequences come in
the form of lost benefits and opportunities, the high toll it exacts is not always
readily apparent. We are able to lull ourselves into a false sense of security by
telling ourselves that it is "better to be safe than sorry." Sadly, this simple maxim
frequently proves perverse with respect to technological implementation and its
regulation.
1. See v. P. Weinberger, C. Quiiinao & P. A. Marquet, Innovation and the Growth ofHuman Population,
372 PHIL. TRANSACrIONS ROYAL Soc'Y B 1, 1-2 (2017) (discussing the impact of technology on the maximum
sustainable population of the Earth).
2. See Odai Y. Khasawneh, Technophobia: Examining Its Hidden Factors and Defining It, 54 TECH.
Soc'Y 93, 94 (2018) (defining technophobia).
3. See Roisin Kiberd, Burn It All Down: A Guide to Neo-Luddism, GIzMODO (Jan. 28, 2015, 11:40 AM),
https://gizmodo.com/the-many-faces-of-neo-luddism-1682139778 [https://perma.cc/Pv46-7L9J] (defining various forms of neo-luddism ranging from sensible to violent).
4. For a background on cognitive biases and heuristics, see the foundational work of Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman. See generallyAmos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics
and Biases, 185 Sct. 1124 (1984).
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Fortunately, as we continue to learn more about cognitive biases and heuristics, we have discovered that they are not shackles that bind human decisionmakers and regulators. 5 There are affirmative measures that each and every one
of us can take to mitigate the effects of our own misperceptions and overcome
6
the shortcomings of our subconscious. There are also legal and structural
changes that we can adopt in order to insulate the decision-making process from
systemic risk misperception. 7 However, it is important to understand that the first
step in solving a problem is recognizing that there is one. That is the primary
contribution of this Article. Only after we accept the presence of systemic technological risk misperception inside each and every one of us, can we then begin
the hard work of counteracting its effects on our decisional processes.
To that end, Part II of this Article recounts classical examples of both risk
under-perception and risk over-perception outside the context of emerging technology, including our nation's close call with thalidomide, our fundamental misunderstanding of the risks associated with flying, and our panicked responses to
perceived threats to child safety. Part III examines how characteristics inherent
to human cognition pair with characteristics inherent to emerging technologies
to create a recipe for systemic risk misperception. Part IV highlights the insidious
nature of the costs that systemic technological risk misperception produces. Part
V proposes a two-pronged remedial approach designed to shelter both individual
and governmental decision-making from the impacts of systemic technological
risk misperception in order to unleash the welfare-enhancing effects that technology can offer our society.
II.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF RISK MISPERCEPTION

8
Humans are notoriously bad at processing and assessing risk. Examples of
this cognitive deficiency are commonplace, such as the tendency to fear flying
but not driving. 9 Risk misperception manifests itself in two ways: under-perception and over-perception. Generally speaking, when humans under-perceive the
risk of some new technology or product, they will likely implement that technology or product before it is ready for safe consumption. This inefficient introduction can result in economic costs and in some cases the preventable loss of life.
Conversely, when humans over-perceive the risks associated with a new

&

5. See id. at 1131.
6. See infra PartV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approachto FederalHealth and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REv. 957, 998-1002 (2001) ("Although [some] risks
can be calculated with reasonable certainty, the public's perception of their frequency and their severity is often
highly inaccurate."); w. Kip Viscusi, Valuing Risk ofDeathfrom Terrorism and NaturalDisasters,38 J. RISK
UNCERTAINTY 191, 210-11 (2009) (comparing the disparate valuations of different sources of risk); w. KIP
VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECON. OF REGUL. & ANTITRUST (5th ed. MIT Press
2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Zeckhauser, Overreaction to FearsomeRisks, 48 ENV'T & RES. ECON. 435

(2011).
9. See, e.g., Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyal & Daniel H. Simon, DrivingFatalitiesAfter 9/11: A Hidden
Cost of Terrorism, 41 APPLIED ECON. 1717, 1717 (2009).
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technology or product, they will often delay or even prohibit implementation.' 0
Inhibiting market introduction results in costs of a more insidious sort." These
costs come in the form of lost opportunities: to generate revenue, for example,
or to improve lives or prevent needless deaths.1 2 The examples below, some historical and some more recent, help to illustrate the operation of risk misperception and its serious costs to society's overall welfare.
A.

The Costs of Risk Under-Perception

While this Article is primarily concerned with risk over-perception as it
relates to emerging technologies, it should be noted that risk under-perception
exacts equally prohibitive costs. In fact, as the below examples demonstrate, risk
under-perception can often lead to subsequent risk over-perception, thus compounding the costs. When under-perception of risks results in premature implementation or introduction of a product or technology, the consequences can be
catastrophic. This can lead to a pervasive sense of distrust or fear in the minds of
consumers, which in turn causes many to avoid the emerging technology or product altogether, even after its flaws have been addressed.
1.

America's Close Call: Thalidomide

America's close call with the teratogen thalidomide offers a salient example of the costs associated with risk under-perception. 3 In 1957, a West German
pharmaceutical company introduced a newly synthesized sleep aid, thalidomide.1 4 It was touted as a "wonder druf ... in the treatment of a range of conditions, in particular morning sickness." 5 In the fall of 1960, William S. Merrell
Company sought approval to introduce the drug to the American market.16
"[S]ince thalidomide was already widely used, the [approval] was thought to be
routine.. .. "17 In fact, thalidomide was considered so safe that a doctor need not
write a prescription for its consumption.18

The task of reviewing the New Drug Application ("NDA") was dropped in
the lap of a greenhorn FDA medical officer, Dr. Francis Kelsey, for her rubberstamp. 19 However, after careful review revealed several discrepancies and
omissions in the NDA, the young doctor refused to approve the drug. 20 Merrell
10. Calandrillo, supra note 8, at 965.
11. See id at 970.
12. Id at 1031-32.
13. See Lisa A. Seidman & Noreen Warren, FrancesKelsey & Thalidomide in the US: A Case Study Relating to PharmaceuticalRegulations, 64 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 495, 499 (2002).
14. Id at 497.
15. Neil vargesson, Thalidomide Embryopathy: An Enigmatic Challenge, ISRN DEVELOPMENTAL
BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2013) (discussing how eagerness to introduce a new medicine into the market caused serious
adverse health effects).
16. Seidman & Warren, supra note 13, at 497.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id
20. See id. at 497-98.
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responded by launching a pressure campaign against Dr. Kelsey and her superiors.21 As she recalled, "[t]hey came to Washington, it seemed, in droves ....
They wrote letters and ... [t]hey telephoned my superiors and they came to see
them too. Most of the things they called me you wouldn't print."
Meanwhile, reports from Europe were beginning to trickle in that thalidomide was causing nerve deterioration in the extremities of long-term users.
Then, finally, came the bombshell that the Germans were taking the drug off the
24
market because it was causing congenital defects. In the end, "anywhere from
25
8,000 to 80,000 thalidomide-deformed babies were born in Europe." Dr. Kelsey "undoubtedly prevented an epidemic of thalidomide-induced birth defects in
the USA," 26 as Merrell had already imported five tons of thalidomide just wait7
ing for the moment of FDA approval. For her profile in courage, Dr. Kelsey
was awarded the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service
28
by President John F. Kennedy.
This close call demonstrates the heavy costs that occur when risk underperception leads to premature implementation of a new product. Thalidomide no
doubt offered, and continues to offer, significant benefits in treating ailments
29
other than morning sickness, but its suboptimal implementation in Europe resulted in deadweight loss to society and unnecessary pain and suffering on the
30
part of the affected families. In an irony that perfectly encapsulates humankind's inability to weigh risk accurately, it appears that this highly visible exam32
31
ple of risk under-perception now leads physicians and their pregnant patients
to over-perceive the risk of a teratogenic birth. Insofar as this risk over-perception results in a suboptimal treatment of pregnant women, the legacy of thalido33
mide continues to exact social costs.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 498.
John Mulliken, A Woman Doctor Who Would Not Be Hurried,LIFE 28 (Aug. 10, 1962).
Seidman & Warren, supra note 13, at 498.
See id.

25.

Id

26.
27.
28.

vargesson, supra note 15, at 1.
Seidman & Warren, supra note 13, at 497.
vargesson, supra note 15, at 1.

29.

See id at 2.

30. See id. at 1.
31. See generally Christine Damase-Michel, Juliette Pichereau, Atul Pathak, Isabelle Lacroix & Jean Louis
Montastruc, Perceptionof Teratogenic and Foetotoxic Risk by Health Professionals:A Survey in Midi-Pyrenees
Area, 6 PHARM. PRAC. 15, 17 (2008) (discussing misperception of teratogenic risk in doctors).
32. See, e.g., Marco De Santis et al., Use of the Internet by Women Seeking Information About Potentially
TeratogenicAgents, 151 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY & REPROD. BIOLOGY 154, 155 (2010); Irene Peterson, Rachel L. McCrea, Angela Lupattelli & Hedvig Nordeng, Women's PerceptionofRisks ofAdverse Fetal
Pregnancy Outcomes: A Large-Scale MultinationalSurvey, 5 BMJ OPEN 1, 1 (2015); Hedvig Nordeng, Eivind
Ystrom & Adrienne Einarson, PerceptionofRisk Regardingthe Use ofMedicationsand OtherExposures During
Pregnancy, 66 EUR. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 207 (2010) (discussing misperception of teratogenic risks by
pregnant women).
33. See Petersen et al., supra note 32, at 7.
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A Modern Analogue: Boeing 737 MAX

Consumers currently over-perceive the risk of defect in new plane models
but under-perceive the growing risk of pilot error and inadequate maintenance.
Airplanes are safer than ever before; the reverse is true of pilots. 34 And yet, consumers and politicians are unable to apportion risk accordingly.35 In fact, consumers are largely unaware of the risks posed by decreasing pilot acumen and
inadequate maintenance in foreign budget airlines. 36 The rhetoric surrounding
the Boeing 737 MAX's grounding demonstrates this phenomenon perfectly,3 7
Most readers familiar with the tragic crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 will likely recognize the narrative of how Boeing
cut corners in a rush to bring the new plane to market and how the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") abdicated its regulatory duties, causing the deaths
of 346 passengers. 38 The images of the Boeing CEO's bipartisan lambasting before Congress will not soon fade from the national memory. 39 For many consumers, the narrative largely begins and ends with Boeing.4 0 To be sure, Boeing
failed airlines and passengers alike. 41 Massively. But as is so often the case, there
is more to the story. 42
In his provocative and controversial New York Times feature, pilot and avi-

ation journalist William Langewiesche, calls attention to consumers' ignorance
surrounding the risks associated with flying.43 In the rush to adopt a narrative
placing the lion's share of the blame on Boeing, consumers are largely oblivious
to Lion Air's share4 4 Here, context is crucial.
Unbeknown to most consumers, there has been a silent, creeping trend in
the aviation industry that represents a substantial source of risk.45 As air travel
becomes increasingly democratized, the demand for pilots has risen

34. See Chris Palmer, The Boeing 737 MAX Saga: Automating Failure, 6 ENG'G 2, 3 (2020) (explaining
how the increase in automation has led to a decrease in skilled pilots).
35. See William Langewiesche, What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html
[https://perma.cc/2R58-

MWMG].
36.

See id.

37.

Id.

38.
39.

See id
See Brianna Gurciullo, Boeing's CEO Takes BipartisanHeat in Second 737 MAX Hearing,POLrico

(Oct. 30, 2019, 3:40 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/30/boeing-ceo-bipartisan-heat-hearing061952 [https://perma.cc/64YV-UES2].
40. See id.
41. See Peter Robison, Boeing Built an Unsafe Plane, and Blamed the Pilots When it Crashed, (November
16, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.con/news/features/2021-11-16/are-boeing-planes-unsafe-pilots-blamed-forcorporate-errors-in-max-737-crash [https://perma.cc/ZE4A-KXG2].
42. See Langewiesche, supra note 35.

43.

Id

44.
45.

See id But see Robison, supra note 41 (arguing Boeing unfairly placed the blame on Lion Air).
See Palmer, supra note 34, at 3.
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47
dramatically. 46 This has led to a drop in the average pilot's skills. Manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus have responded to this decrease in airmanship by
48
attempting to automate pilot error out of the equation. This led to "a decadeslong transformation .. . in which airplanes became so automated and accidents
so rare that a cheap air-travel boom was able to take root around the world."49
Unfortunately, this means that in the rare instances where automation fails, pilots
50
are now ill-trained to meet the task. "The more automation there is, the less
pilots et to fly manually, making them less capable of dealing with emergencies."5
Langewiesche points out that Boeing's job is made impossibly difficult by
the decisions of foreign budget airlines, like Lion Air, to compromise their train52
ing and internal procedures in the pursuit of razor-thin margins. He describes
53
Lion Air as a prime example of the "challenges facing airline safety." It has a
history of pushing deregulation, corrupting government officials, pressuring
flight crews to keey unsafe planes in the air, and paying employees meager wages
for longer hours. 4 He goes on to explain how the pilots' actions prior to the
55
crashes of both planes were "textbook failure[s] of airmanship." Furthermore,
the plane had been experiencing problems over the course of three days leading
up to Lion Air Flight 610.56 In the flight immediately preceding the crash an "offduty pilot hitching a ride on that earlier flight correctly diagnosed [and rectified]
the [exact same] problem . . . .7 A "replacement [angle-of-attack] sensor that
was installed [by Lion Air maintenance] on the accident aircraft had been mis58
calibrated during an earlier repair." This mis-calibrated sensor in turn was feeding erroneous data to the Boeing software which regulators argue did not have
enough redundancies. 59 In what Langewiesche describes as an act of "grotesque

46.

Id

Jack Nicas & Zach wichter, A Worry for Some Pilots: Their Hands-On Flying Skills Are Lacking,
14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/business/automated-planes.html
TrnEs (Mar.
N.Y.
[https://perma.cc/6Q2H-LC9X] ("Pilots now spend more time learning these automated systems than practicing
hands-on flying, so newer pilots are less comfortable with taking manual control when the computer steers them
wrong, according to interviews with a dozen pilots and pilot instructors at major airlines and aviation universities
47.

around the world.").
48. See Langewiesche, supra note 35.

49.

Id

50. See id.; Palmer, supra note 34, at 3.
51. Palmer, supra note 34, at 3 (quoting Carlos Varela, associate professor of computer science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); see also Nicas & Wichter, supra note 47.
52. See Langewiesche, supra note 35.

53.

Id

54. See id.
55. Id But see Robison, supra note 41 (implying that racism and xenophobia contribute to the decision to
apportion blame to Lion Air's pilots).
56. See Langewiesche, supra note 35 ("Th[e] story actually starts three days before the accident, when the
same airplane ... experienced errors in airspeed and altitude indications .. . that weren't properly addressed.").
57. Palmer, supra note 34, at 2.
58. National Transportation Safety Committee, Aircraft Accident Investigation Report 215 (2018),

http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntscaviation/baru/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Fina%
[https://perma.cc/V8Q8-NH9Y].
59. Id

2

0Report.pdf
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negligence," Lion Air's maintenance crew ran a few cursory tests and cleared the
plane for takeoff.60
Langewiesche's conclusion that "it was the decisions made by four of those
pilots, more than the failure of a single obscure component, that led to 346
deaths ... "61 has faced strong criticism from many aviation insiders, including
Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger. 62 But the most damning and concerning
portions of Langeweische's piece are not his conclusions that fault lay primarily
with the pilots. Rather, it is his unrefuted 63 descriptions of the inner-workings of
a budget airline that are most alarming.4 They represent a disturbing source of
risk that is almost entirely absent from the narrative surrounding the risks of flying in general, let alone flying in a 737 MAX.
The inability of consumers to adequately recognize the different sources of
risk that contribute to a catastrophic accident means they cannot apportion blame
with precision. Because blame is not being apportioned correctly, prescriptive
resources cannot be allocated in an efficient manner that takes into account all
sources of risk. This over-perception of the risk posed by manufacturing failures
and under-perception of the risks posed by airline company and employee malpractice exacts immense costs in terms of dollars and lives. 65 As the 737 MAX
returns to the air, Boeing has suffered $20 billion in losses, including a $2.5 billion dollar criminal settlement. 66 The true economic costs of this backlash against
Boeing will likely extend much further. 67 Meanwhile, Lion Air continues to operate flights.

60.

See Langewiesche, supra note 35.
Id.
62. See Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, My Letter to the Editor of New York Times Magazine, SULLY
SULLENBERGER (Oct. 13, 2019), http://www.sullysullenberger.com/my-letter-to-the-editor-of-new-york-timesmagazine/ [https://perma.cc/RS9T-MSGA].
63. Even Captain Sullenberger, in his critique of Langewiesche, acknowledged that "[i]nadequate pilot
training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide .... " Id. (emphasis added). This is alarming
and largely unknown to the general public.
64. See Langewiesche, supra note 35 (describing "an onrush of inexperienced pilots willing to work long
hours for low pay; discouragement among mechanics, ramp workers and dispatchers; pressure to keep airplanes
flying despite component failures that should have grounded them; the falsification of cargo and passenger manifests; dual maintenance and flight logs; and corruption permeating the entire system, including even air-traffic
control.").
65. Leslie Josephs, Boeing to Pay More than $2.5 Billion to Settle Criminal Conspiracy Charge over 737

61.

Max, CNBC (Jan. 8, 2021, 8:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/07/doj-fines-boeing-over-2point5-billioncharges-it-with-fraud-conspiracy-over-737-max-crashes.html [https://perma.cc/C8SC-VH84]; Langewiesche,
supra note 35.
66. Josephs, supra note 65.
67. See, e.g., Dominic Gates, Boeing Reports Worst Full-Year Loss in Its History, but CEO Calhoun Vows
'We'll Get Through It,' SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020, 4:40 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-doubles-the-projected-cost-of-the-737-max-grounding-to-18-4-billion/ [https://perma.cc/

GJ6N-2A26].
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Examples of risk under-perception are legion. Whether it be failing to get
a flu shot 68 or persisting in a red meat diet,69 humans have an uncanny ability to
minimize their perceptions of certain risks. As seen in the examples above, this
under-perception of risk can often lead to a catastrophic event, causing consumers to over-perceive risk for years, even decades, after the event. This seesaw
effect exacts tremendous social and economic costs. When new technologies and
products are introduced too soon, as with thalidomide and the 737 MAX, lives
can be cut short and companies can be left battered. 70 But when subsequent risk
over-perception prevents these technologies from entering the market when they
are ready or for a different, safer application, the costs can be much more insidious.
B.

The Costs ofRisk Over-Perception

As evidenced by the 737 MAX example, risk perception can sometimes
approximate a zero-sum game. By under-perceiving the risk of pilot error, flyers
and regulators over-perceive the risk of design failure. But the nature of risk
over-perception is fundamentally different from under-perception. Typically,
risk over-perception causes decisionmakers to maintain the status quo (i.e., preventing or delaying implementation of a new technology) for fear of an unknown
71
risk or to choose an alternative that might have equally unknown consequences.
Consequently, the costs associated with over-perception tend to be more incidental and insidious because the risks that are over-perceived, and thus protected
72
against, are typically the most obvious and apparent ones. As the examples
below demonstrate, the costs associated with maintaining the status quo or opting
for a more comfortable alternative can be quite difficult for most people to comprehend.

68. Estimates ofFlu Vaccination CoverageAmong Children-UnitedStates, 2017-18 Flu Season, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage-1718estimates-children.htm [https://perma.cc/9RvS-YWV8] (estimating flu vaccination coverage among children at
57.9%); Estimates ofInfluenza Vaccination Coverage amongAdults-UnitedStates, 2017-18 Flu Season, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 25, 2018),

https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage-1718estimates.htm [https://perma.cc/7C7K-PF4C] (estimating flu
vaccination coverage among adults at 37.1%).
69. See Frank Qian, Matthew C. Riddle, Judith Wylie-Rosett & Frank B. Hu, Red and Processed Meats
and Health Risks: How Strong Is the Evidence?, 43 DIABETES CARE 265, 269 (2020) ("while more evidence
regarding the health effects of red and processed meats is needed, the body of epidemiologic data showing their
associations with type 2 diabetes, [cardiovascular disease], and cancer is large and consistent."); see also Rui

Gasper et al., Consumers' Avoidance of Information on Red Meat Risks: Information Exposure Effects on Attitudes and PerceivedKnowledge, 19 J. RISK RSCH. 533, 544 (2016) ("[I]nformation avoidance appears to protect
people against [cognitive] dissonance by shielding attitudes toward red meat from information on risk that may
be inconsistent with consumers' positive views of it.").
70. See Seidman & Warren, supra note 13, at 500; Langewiesche, supra note 35.
71. See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 8, at 965.

72. See id. at 961.
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School Bus Regulation

In their book, The StruggleforAuto Safety, Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst
differentiate between "near opposite ends of a [legislative] continuum ranging
from autocratic control to populist uprising." 73 In the former, congressional committees, working with interest groups, pass regulation without much public debate. 74 In the latter, "dissenting committees with jurisdictional authority are circumvented by new players who use general public sentiment to move a Congress
acting as a committee of the whole. Public demand is neither suppressed nor
mediated by expertise."75 In their section on school bus regulation, they explain
how public over-perception of the risks associated with school busses resulted in
a more populist form of lawmaking. 76 "Instead of protecting and rewarding expert judgment, the committees ultimately embraced the passions of legislative
and administrative outsiders .... "77
In the 1960s and 70s, a movement for school bus safety began snowballing
after some members of Congress-whose districts had experienced school bus
tragedies-and some physicians groups began to call for heightened safety in
school transportation.' 8 Mashaw and Harfst explain that this "'movement' had
the usual emotional appeal of any group seeking to protect children" and was
"armed with descriptions of gruesome accidents." 79
There was just one problem for these activists. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") had studied the issue extensively and determined the costs outweighed the benefits.8 0 At the time, the rules that Congress
was considering adopting would only address thirty child fatalities.8 1 Meanwhile, the changes would increase the cost of school busses by twenty-five percent nationwide. 82 Moreover, these measures actually offered to create perverse
substitution risks. The "costs were so substantial that further measures might actually reduce school bus safety.. ." because districts would elect to keep older,
unsafe buses on the road for longer. 83 Nevertheless, senators and representatives
alike condemned the NHTSA for even engaging in cost-benefit analysis in the
context of child safety, going so far as to threaten congressional investigation of
the agency. 84

As Congress lurched toward adoption of the measures, Mashaw and Harfst
explain that "it was obvious that regulatory officials had badly botched their

73.

JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 141-42.
Id.
See id at 142.
Id.
Id
See id.
See id. at 143.
Id
See id at 143-44.

141

(1990).
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85
assessment of the costs and benefits of school bus safety." But not for the reason that one might think. Their calculations were rational and reasonable, and
their recommendations reflected careful analysis and weighing of the pros and
cons. 86 According to Mashaw and Harfst, their mistake was that "[t]hey had confused economics with politics. In the political process and in the media, sober
87
cost-benefit calculations are about as popular as rich, absentee slumlords."
They had also failed to account for widespread risk over-perception among the
88
public and its legislators when it came to child safety.
It would seem that risk misperception in this instance was also zero-sum.
The over-perception of school bus risk was accompanied by an under-perception
of passenger vehicle risk. "If Congress wanted to protect the lives of children, it
would have done better to reenergize NHTSA's lagging [regulation of passenger
vehicles]." 89 As will be discussed later in this Article, "[e]ven modest safety enhancement[s] would [have] decrease[d] the risk of death or serious injury for tens
of thousands of children. .... "90 There is no clearer showing of the deadly implications of risk misperception.

2.

Child RestraintRegulations in CommercialFlights

Some child safety advocates have long lobbied for the FAA to adopt regulations requiring all children to wear some sort of restraint on commercial
flights. 91 These restrictions would require families to purchase additional tickets
for infants. 92 While advocates of the regulations over-perceive the risk of injury
or death to unrestrained infants, they under-perceive the costs associated with
implementing such a policy. By requiring families to purchase an additional seat
for their infant, many of those families will be priced out of the market for air
travel. 93 As an alternative, these less-wealthy families may choose a more economical, yet more dangerous, method of transportation: driving. The resulting
deaths caused by the perverse incentive to take to the highways instead of the
airways (i.e., the substitution risk) would likely outweigh any lives saved by the
restraint policy. 94
In November of 2001, the American Academy of Pediatrics ("AAP") issued a policy statement advocating for a new FAA regulation that would require
all children to be restrained. 9 5 Under existing regulations, children under the age
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 144.
See id.
Id
See id.
Id at 146.
Id
See FAA Once Again Dances Around Mandatory Child Restraint Issue, 8 AIR SAFETY WEEK, Oct. 3,

91.
1994 (detailing previous attempts to mandate child restraints).
92. Thomas B. Newman, Brian D. Johnston & David C. Grossman, Effects and Costs ofRequiring ChildRestraint Systems for Young Children Traveling on Commercial Airplanes, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC
ADOLESCENT MED. 969, 969 (2003).

93.
94.
95.

Id
Id
See American Academy of Pediatrics, Restraint Use on Aircraft, 108 PEDIATRICS 1218, 1218 (2001).
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of two were allowed to be held in an adult's lap throughout the flight. 96 Historically, the FAA had declined to alter this rule because it would "result in more
injuries and deaths to infants and toddlers because parents would not be willing
to buy a ticket to reserve a seat for the infant and would opt to travel by car
instead . .. ."97 The AAP argued no data supported the FAA's claim. 98 Meanwhile, the AAP's own data recognized that the risk of flying in general was "exceedingly small." 99 At the time, it was "estimated that 4.6 million children
younger than 2 years fly on US domestic airlines annually ... ."lo While the
AAP's data supported the contention that unrestrained infants had a higher relative mortality risk than restrained adults, it could not determine "whether the
higher risk of mortality for infants was attributable to lack of restraint use, fragility of infants, or both." 101
In response to the AAP's proposal, pediatricians from the University of

California, San Francisco and the University of Washington defended the FAA's
reasons for declining to require the child restraints. 1 02 They began by pointing
out that the AAP policy statement "did not present any analysis of the numbers
of lives that might be saved by [their proposed] policy or the policy's costs." 103
"Using available data on the risk of fatalities from air travel and the survivability
of crashes and reasonable assumptions," they went on to supply the cost-benefit
analysis that the AAP had omitted.104 The doctors estimated the AAP's policy
would prevent an average of 0.4 deaths per year.105 Altering their base assuntions, they estimated the number could range from .05 to 1.6 deaths per year. 6
On the other hand, they found that the proposed policy would result in a net
increase in deaths if just five to ten percent of families chose automobile travel
instead of flying. 107 "Even if the policy led to no increase in car travel and cost
only $20 per round trip per young child, the cost per life saved would be about
$4.3 million per discounted life-year." 10 8 Ultimately, the FAA yielded to the science and sided against the AAP. 109
As with most studies of this kind, the authors openly admit they could not
feasibly consider every single factor. 1 0 However, they fundamentally disagreed
with the AAP's "assertion that no data support the FAA's concern about travel
96.

Id

97.
98.

Id
See id

99.
100.
101.

Id at 1219.

102.

Id
Id
Newman et al., supra note 92.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id
Id. at
Id at
Id at
Id at
Id. at

972.
969.
970-71.
971.
973.

109. Press Release, Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Announces Decision on Child Safety Seats
(Aug. 25, 2005), https://www.faa.gov/news/press-releases/newsstory.cfmcontentKey=1966
[https://perma.

cc/97SW-AFPZ].
110.

Newman et al., supra note 92, at 973.
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substitution and believe[d] that analyses of benefits and costs can inform policy
decisions like this one .. . ."1 Indeed, it is unsettling that the AAP would maintain there is no data supporting the contention that more lives would be lost as a
result of FAA mandated child restraints given the FAA itself had "argued in a
1995 report to Congress that [child restraints] on aircraft would prevent a maximum of 5 child plane crash deaths per 10 years and would result in a net increase
of 82 deaths per 10 years ... .,112 Unfortunately, by refusing to address the data
and over-perceiving the relative risk posed by unrestrained infant air travel, the
AAP advocated for a policy that might have accomplished the very thing it
sought to avoid. The crucial failing on the part of the AAP is not that it failed to
weigh the different sources of risk, rather it failed altogether to seriously consider
the substitution risk posed by increased driving.
3.

School Shootings

The national discourse over school shootings is one marred by dramatic
risk over-perception. Even though a student has better odds of being struck by
lightning than dying in a school shooting, the narrative of the school massacre
11 3
dominates the discussion over gun violence. And understandably so-nobody
wants to be perceived as an apologist for the deaths of innocent children. The
harsh reality, however, is that there are more pressing matters in the context of
4
In a world of finite resources,
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Id. at 969-70.
Id. at 969.
See Jason Bedrick, How Common Are School Shootings?, CATO INST.: CATO LIBERTY (Sept. 22, 2014,

4:47 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/how-common-are-school-shootings

[https://perma.cc/Y7ST-H7SL].

See Gun Violence Statistics, GIFFORDS L. CTR. https://lawcenter.giffords.org/facts/gun-violence-statistics/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/S5ZB-XZYK
115. Gun suicides make up 61% of gun-related deaths in America. Id. Black men make up 52% of all gun
114.

homicide victims. Id.
116. See Alia Wong, The Gun Violence That's a Bigger Threat to Kids than School Shootings, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/02/gun-violence-children-actually-experience
/582964/ [https://perma.cc/NM9Z-WR2P] ("Seldom do ... fatalities happen on school campuses at all, in fact.
While comprehensive data are limited, a 2017 study found that the majority-85 percent-of children 12 or
younger who were shot to death from 2003 to 2013 were killed in a home. Roughly four in 10 kids aged 13 to 17
who were killed with a gun also died in a home; another four in 10 were killed in the streets. Meanwhile, nearly
two in three of the country's gun deaths (of all ages) are the result of suicide .... [P]ublic mass shootings make
up less than 1 percent of firearm fatalities, according to separate reporting by The N.Y. Times.").
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The Columbine High School Massacre of 1999 was a watershed moment
in American history." 7 American schoolchildren forever occupy a post-Columbine era.' 1 "Previous school shootings were, for the most part, rash acts of violence and left few people dead.... Columbine inaugurated a new template for
mass shootings in America: the spectacle murder."1 9 Of the ten deadliest school
shootings, seven have occurred post-Columbine. 120 Images of bloodied high
school students fleeing from their Colorado classrooms with their arms raised
have been supplemented in the national consciousness with the faces of little
boys and girls from the peaceful Connecticut village of Newtown.121 "60% of
teens say they are worried about a shooting occurring at their school." 2 2 Mass
school shootings dominate the narrative of gun-control proponents and opponents alike.1 23 Yet, notwithstanding the availability of post-Columbine school
shootings, "the statistical likelihood of any given public school student being
killed by a gun, in school, on any given day since [Columbine] was roughly 1 in
614,000,000."124 In fact, students are 246 times more likely to die by gun suicide,
156 times more likely to die in a community shooting, forty-two times more
likely to die in a domestic violence shooting, and thirty-seven times more likely
to die from an accidental shooting. 2 5 This begs the question: why do school
shootings drive the gun-control narrative? The answer is risk over-perception due
to the sensational, dreadful nature of the risk.

117. See Michael Luo, Twenty Years After Columbine, NEW YORKER, https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/twenty-years-after-columbine (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/UT6v-YXHX].
118. See Eric Mafdis, "It'sBetter to Overreact":School Officials' Fearand PerceivedRisk ofRampage
Attacks and the Criminalizationof American Public Schools, 24 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 39, 40 (2016) (comparing the post-Columbine era to a post-9/11 era).
119.
120.

Luo, supra note 117.

See, e.g., Number of Victims ofSchoool Shootings in the United States Between 1982 and November
2021, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/476381/school-shootings-in-the-us-by-victim-count/ (last
visited Jan. 16, 2022) [perma.cc/UJ38-47D7]; Meghan Keneally, The 11 Mass Deadly School Shootings that
Have HappenedSince Columbine, ABC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2019, 8:28 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/11-massdeadly-school-shootings-happened-columbine/storyid=62494128
[https://perma.cc/34TN-94S9];
Bonnie
Berkowitz & Chris Alcantara, The Terrible Numbers that Grow with Each Mass Shooting, WASH. POST (May
12, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/mass-shootings-in-america/ [https://perma.

cc/J7GL-VT9D].
121. See, e.g., Michael Ray, Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting, BRITANNICA (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Sandy-Hook-Elementary-School-shooting [https://perma.cc/FPE4-HXC5]. [
122. GIFFORDS L. CTR., THE TRUTH ABOUT SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 3 (2019), https://www.giffords.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/The-Truth-About-School-Shootings-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR.P2-YYK9].
123. See, e.g., Emma Newburger, Biden Callsfor Congress to Pass Stricter Gun Laws on Anniversary of
ParklandMass Shooting, CNBC (Feb. 14, 2021, 4:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/14/biden-calls-oncongress-to-reform-gun-laws-on-anniversary-of-parkland-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/VMH7-R3TH]; AJ
Willingham, At Its First Meeting After Parkland, the NRA Draws Attention to Mass Shootings, CNN,

https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/05/politics/nra-convention-trnd-cnnphotos/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022)

[https://perma.cc/Z2GQ-WJJH].
124. David Ropeik, School Shootings are ExtraordinarilyRare. Why Is Fear of them Driving Policy?,
WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/school-shootings-are-extraordinarily-

rare-why-is-fear-of-them-driving-policy/2018/03/08/f4ead9f2-2247-1 e8-94da-ebf9d 112159cstory.html
[https://perma.cc/M5D2-5U4D].
125. GIFFORDS L. CTR., supranote 122, at 7.
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If a hypothetical poll were to ask whether schools should be safer, the pollster would be hard-pressed to find a naysayer. 126 If the poll were to ask, however,
whether already safe schools should be safer at the cost of educational quality
27
and students' civil liberties, the pollster might observe different results.1 While
the latter question represents the reality on the ground in schools across America,
28
students, parents, and administrators primarily ask the former.1 By adopting a
zero-tolerance mindset where it is "better to overreact," these groups fundamen29
tally over-perceive the risk of school shootings.1 Furthermore, they turn a blind
eye to the harmful effects of their overreaction.13
This misperception is not victimless. In an empirical study of school administrators, University of Washington professor Eric Mafdis found support for
3
what many researchers have dubbed "the Columbine Effect."' ' He observed that
when "the genuinely high potential cost of school rampage fused with the perception of high probability, . .. school rampages came to be viewed as a risk that
3
... must be avoided at nearly any cost."1 This zero tolerance mindset emphasizes "surveillance, securitization, and criminalization rather than more amelio33
He contends that these
rative forms of prevention, such as restorative justice."
"zero tolerance policies and enhanced security practices ... are di sproportionately used to surveille and punish students of color in urban areas."1 Moreover,
they "are routinely applied to stigmatize and penalize students for relatively petty
3
"In
crimes like drug use, disorderly conduct, and vandalism, not violence."
this process, significant concerns about students' civil liberties and schools' limited financial resources were broadly deemed as subordinate to the primary goal
36
of school safety."1
There is a reason obviously guilty criminal defendants are guaranteed procedural protections. 3 7 Sure, it might increase public safety on the front end to
eliminate such protections, but it exacts back-end costs to civil liberties and civil

- 126. See, e.g., Emily Swanson, Carolyn Thompson & Hannah Fingerhut, AP-NORC Poll: Most Believe
Schools Have Become Less Safe, AP NEWS (Apr. 16, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/north-america-us-news-

ap-top-news-bullying-shootings-39a6676a68ca4e81bc22253bble8
127.
128.
129.
tolerance,
130.
131.

132.
133.

4

eeb [https://perma.cc/ARU2-K6XS].

See Mafdis, supra note 118, at 51.
See id
See id. at 49 (explaining how administrators have responded to school shootings by taking a zerohypervigilance approach to policing schools).
See id.
Id at 42.

Id. at 49.

Id.
&

134. Id at 51 (citing Pamela Fenning & Jennifer Rose, OverrepresentationofAfrican American Students
in Exclusionary Discipline: The Role of School Policy, 42 URB. EDUC. 536; Katherine Irwin, Janet Davidson
Amanda Hall-Sanchez, The Race to Punish in American Schools: Class and Race Predictorsof Punitive SchoolCrime Control, 21 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 47 (2013)).
135. Id. (citing AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE OF FEAR (2010)).

136.

Id. at 49.

137.

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25 (1997)

("Long live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not men.").

No. 2]

TERRIFIED BY TECHNOLOGY

613

participation. 138 Stop-and-frisk might make life safer for some, but it conflicts
with fundamental American values. 1 39 The same principles should apply to
safety in schools and to those who have not yet been vested with any political
rights.
Students' civil liberties are not the only victims of the over-perception of
school shooting risk. 140 According to Professor Mafdis' study, administrators
viewed the quality of education at their school as another unfortunate sacrificial
lamb that must yield to safety concerns despite the infinitesimally small risk
probability. 141 Ironically, the very measures taken by administrators to make students feel safer are destructive of that end. 142 "[T]he expansion of zero-tolerance
policies and school security measures, have been linked to higher levels of fear
and perceived disorder among students."1 43 In turn, these higher levels of fear
directly correlate to poor academic achievement among students.144
It is not better to overreact. "Better safe than sorry" is an oversimplification
and is often untrue. Nor is it better to underreact. Rather, it is better to react appropriately-the Goldilocks concept of what is "just right." Of course, this is
easier said than done. In the context of school shootings, however, reactions do
not even come close to reflecting statistical realities. 14 Overreaction is a mental
crutch that interferes with any rational discussion or debate over school safety or
gun violence. Until the national discourse reflects the fact that "schools are one
of the safest places in the United States," 146 prescriptive measures will be unable
to adequately address the issues of school shootings and gun violence in general. 14 Moreover, those measures will continue to exact backend social costs.
4.

A Modern Analogue: SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19)

The mixture of panic and ostriching that gripped the nation immediately
following the 2019-2020 outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a
paradigmatic example of systemic risk misperception. Nobody, even the

138.

See e.g., Joel Rose, Mike Bloomberg Can'tShake the Legacy ofStop-and-FriskPolicing in New York,

NPR (Feb. 25, 2020,4:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/25/809368292/the-legacy-of-stop-and-frisk-policing-in-michael-bloombergs-new-york [https://perma.cc/3LY9-GSKZ] (detailing then-presidential candidate
Mike Bloomberg's apology for stop-and-frisk).
139. See id.
140. See Mafdis, supra note 118, at 45.
141. See id. ("The notion that safety and security, as opposed to education, would be the top priority of
principals at schools in low crime middle class suburban areas is a fairly new development, and likely one seldom
present before the influence of Columbine.")
142. See Benjamin W. Fisher, Students' Perceptions of Safety at School After Sandy Hook, 16 J. SCH.
VIOLENCE 349, 357 (2017).

143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.

See Mafdis, supra note 118, at 47.
146. Erin K. Nekvasil, Dewey G. Cornell & Francis L. Huang, Prevalenceand Offense Characteristicsof
Multiple Casualty Homicides: Are Schools at HigherRisk than OtherLocations?, 5 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 236, 241

(2015).
147.

Id. at 242.
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experts,148 got it right initially. Many, including the authors, significantly underestimated the risk posed by this virus. 149 Others exhibited extreme and irrational
coping behaviors in their overestimation of the risk." 0 COVID-19 "might just
be the perfect case study for understanding how errors in risk perception lead us
15 1
astray. In short, coronavirus shows that we still suck at assessing risk."
Toward the end of 2019, reports of an uptick in pneumonia cases began to
trickle out of Wuhan, China. 152 By the new year, Chinese officials suspected that
a novel coronavirus had jumped species from the wild animals sold in the Huanan
Wet Market to their human captors.153 As infections and information began to
spread to the United States, what Politicocommentators, Sudeep Reddy and Victoria Guida, dubbed "The Great Coronavirus Panic of 2020" set in.l 4 As they
described it, "America is losing its collective mind over coronavirus, and nobody
really knows whether it's justified or not."155 The seeds of this confusion began
with a lie.
Presidents lie. 156 All the time.15 7 Some of these lies are necessary; even
moral. For example, FDR lied about being non-interventionist as he silently prepared for WWII. 1 58 But some of these lies are unconscionable; even impeachable. 159 For example, Nixon and Clinton came under threat of impeachment for
obstructing justice through false statements. 160 "On January 28th of [2020], before the virus was on anyone's radar, the national security advisor, Robert
O'Brien, told [President Trump], 'This virus will be the biggest national security

148. See Ja'han Jones, Surgeon General Jerome Adams Tries to Walk Back Past Bad Mask Advice,
HuFFPOST (July 13, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/surgeon-general-jerome-adams-defends-face-

masks-coronavirus_n_5fb62cec5b63a72c3436d4e?guccounter=1&gucereferrer=aHROcHM6Ly93d3cuZ2
9vZ2xILmNvbS8&gucereferrersig=AQAAAGTEvdugO-m7OXdVF5xPmXbCvG5OQXLC2SEa8yxkWT
39BvRVD12afHeqHDBdbjOchcb092CG30NHA25X5wuSvv_9B7CRKU3uwwZOB-1UIKGSYDHC63DvM4
815HkJufd5UuSRxZI08cbN6dvwgNO3TKUI267mYksbV5zalE-X7_ [https://perma.cc/KFU6-JBMJ].
149. Alison Bernstein, Coronavirus Shows We Still Suck at Assessing Risk, SCIMOMS (Mar. 14, 2020),
https://scimoms.com/coronavirus-risk/[https://perma.cc/5G3G-9Y3N].

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Coronavirus Outbreak Timeline Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 23, 2020, 10:23 AM), https://www.cnn.
com/2020/02/06/health/wuhan-coronavirus-timeline-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/R6SX-QFB3].
153. Wuhan Bans Eating Wild Animals as Coronavirus Drives a Crackdown in China, CBS NEWS (May
21, 2020, 8:51. AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wuhan-china-coronavirus-bans-eating-wild-animalsbreeding-wet-markets/ [https://perma.cc/QBQ7-BDAE] ("The coronavirus that causes COVID-19 is widely believed to have passed from bats to people, possibly via another species, before spreading worldwide.").

154. Sudeep Reddy & Victoria Guida, The Great CoronavirusPanicof2020, POLITICO (Mar. 9,2020,8:00
2
AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-money/2020/03/09/the-great-coronavirs-panic-of- 020785941 [perma.cc/7DSK-3MG6].
155. Id.
156. See e.g., Michael Blake, From Washington to Trump, All Presidents Have Told Lies (But Only Some
Have Told Them for the Right Reasons), CONVERSATION (Sept. 17, 2020) https://theconversation.com/fromwashington-to-trump-all-presidents-have-told-lies-but-only-some-have-told-them-for-the-right-reasons-145995

[perma.cc/64WZ-QKKT].
157. See id.
158. Id
159.

CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. & PHILIP BOBBITr, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 81 (2018).

160. Id. at 79.
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threat you face in your presidency.'"161 By February 7, 2020, Trump told Bob
Woodward that the virus "goes through air" and was "more deadly than ... even
your strenuous flus." 162 He estimated that the virus was five times more deadly
than the flu.1 63

President Trump then faced a choice: tell the American people the truth
about the risk posed by the virus or lie to them. He chose to lie. Until the end of
March 2020, Trump publicly maintained that the virus was no worse than the
flu. 164 Around that time, he told Bob Woodward, "I wanted to always play it
down. I still like playing it down because I don't want to create a panic." 16 5 As
we argue in Part V, the answer to potential risk misperception is not to obfuscate
or mislead. Misinformation begets misperception. Rather, the American public,
equipped with accurate information, and the tools to process that information,
can become much more accurate risk-perceivers. President Trump fundamentally misunderstood the nature of risk misperception and missed an opportunity
to marshal what could have been an unforgettable moment of American resilience. And the panic still came.
As far as human nature is concerned, with panic comes irrationality.'6
Fearing both the virus and a government-mandated quarantine, consumers congregated outside of Costcos, Walmarts, and other grocers to hoard supplies. 167
Notwithstanding the massive risk of community spread, heedless and panicked
consumers mobbed businesses overwhelmingly in search of one single creature
comfort: toilet paper. 168 Some even came to fisticuffs over it. 169 Of course, toilet
paper is not the only example of irrational hoarding behavior. People purchased
161. Scott Pelley, Donald Trump's Conversations with Bob Woodward About Coronavirus, Black Lives
Matter and Nuclear War, CBS NEws (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-bobwoodward-rage-60-minutes-2020-09-13/ [perma.cc/666D-YZU3].

162.
163.

Id.

Jamie Gangel & Elizabeth Stuart, "Pretty Cool. Right?" Unfiltered Moments from Trump's 18 Interviews with Bob Woodward, CNN (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/09/politics/trump-bob-wood-

ward-interviews/index.html [perma.cc/WK8S-B28S].
164. Tommy Beer, All the Times Trump ComparedCovid-19 to the Flu, Even After He Knew Covid-19 Was
FarMore Deadly, Forbes (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/09/10/all-the-timestrump-compared-covid-19-to-the-flu-even-after-he-knew-covid-19-was-far-more-deadly/?sh=lefcl7f5f9d2
[https://perma.cc/S9VW-4BK3].
165. Tamara Keith, Trump Says He PreventedPanic on Pandemic, That'sNot His UsualApproach, NPR

(Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/12/912081447/trump-says-he-prevented-panic-on-pandemicthats-not-his-usual-approach [perma.cc/VES2-SS92].
166. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kluger, In the Wake ofthe Coronavirus,Here's Why Americans Are Hoarding Toilet
Paper, TItE (Mar. 14, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://time.com/5803273/hoarding-toilet-paper/ [https://perma.cc/

Z8MV-XTE3].
167. Id.
168. See e.g., id.; Richard Hall, Coronavirus: Why People Are Panic Buying Toilet Paper,According to a
Pandemic Expert, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 15, 2020, 8:58 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ameri-

cas/coronavims-toilet-paper-panic-buying-covid-9-uk-australia-a9403351.html
XGJM].

[https://perma.cc/3Z5T-

169. See, e.g., David Blank, FamilyMembers Get into a FightWhen One Accuses the Otherof Hiding Toilet
Paper, CNN, (Apr. 8, 2020, 10:47 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/08/us/toilet-paper-family-fight-arresttrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/64JR-B8EM]; Lee Brown, Women Fight over Toilet Paper During Coronavirus Panic Buying in Australia, N.Y. POST (Mar. 8, 2020, 5:04 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/03/08/womenfight-over-toilet-paper-during-coronavirus-panic-buying-in-australia/ [https://perma.cc/54TR-7AE3].
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170
There
stocks of bottled water, as if preparing for an earthquake or hurricane.
171
Environmental
the
Both
water.
on
bottled
up
to
stock
was absolutely no reason
Protection Agency and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC")
had announced that normal disinfection processes for tap water suffice to kill any
virus that causes COVID-19. 172 Furthermore, unlike in the case of an earthquake
or hurricane, government services such as water sanitation and delivery were not
at risk of shutting down.1 73
Consumers also began hoarding gallons of hand sanitizer.1 74 CNN reported
that in some places "desperation for the stuff [was] rising to the level of thievery."' 75 Capitalizing on consumer irrationality, price gougers sold their stores of
hand sanitizer to willing purchasers at exorbitant rates.17 The internet exploded
with do-it-yourself hand sanitizer recipes.1 77 One New Jersey 7-Eleven owner
78
sold a homemade concoction that caused chemical burns to several children.1
All the while, information was readily available that handwashing was far superior to hand sanitizer use. 179 Yet there was no corresponding run on hand soap.
Here is where the contradiction becomes apparent: consumers stocked up on staple goods for the home in preparation for government-mandated quarantine but
also stocked up on hand sanitizer as if they would be in public for extended

170. See Jefferson Graham, Amid CoronavirusBuying, Amazon Sold out ofBottled Water and Toilet Paper,
Too, USA TODAY (Mar. 16, 2020, 11:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/03/15/amazon-toiletpaper-water-household-items/5055632002/ [https://perma.cc/3Z9F-9P9R].
171. Tracy Quinn, COVID-19: Why Most Don't Need to Stockpile Bottled Water, NRDC (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/tracy-quinn/covid-19-why-most-dont-need-stockpile-bottled-water
[https://perma.ccMf7GH-RL9Z].
172.

See Water and COVID-19 FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 23, 2020),

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/water.html [https://perma.cc/WS5C-ZU9J]; Coronavirus and
Drinking Water and Wastewater, ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/coronavirus/coronavirus-anddrinking-water-and-wastewater (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/VK8M-KTCB].
173. ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 172.
174. Ford vox, Why We Can't FindHand Sanitizer, CNN (Mar. 11, 2020,4:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/

2020/03/11/opinions/hand-sanitizer-coronavirus-opinion-vox/index.html [https://perma.cc/2NXD-TYR4].
175. Id.
176.

See id
See Alicia Lee, Don't Try to Make Your Own Hand Sanitizer Just Because There's a Shortagefrom
Coronavirus,CNN (Mar. 3, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/03/healtb/coronavirus-diyhand-

177.

sanitizer-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/EG84-6SNP.
178.

See Leah Asmelash, Police Seize Likely Homemade Sanitizerfrom a 7-Eleven After a Young Boy Was

Allegedly Burned by It, CNN (Mar. 11, 2020, 3:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/11/us/7-eleven-new-jersey-sanitizer-bum-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/6L3A-HGM5]; see also Anna Medaris Miller, A Pharmacy
Tried to Help People Make Their Own Hand Sanitizer Because of Coronavirus-Related Shortages, but It Posted
the Wrong Recipe, INSIDER (Mar. 6,2020,9:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/pharmacy-posted-wrongrecipe-how-to-make-hand-sanitizer-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/G8M3-HCNA] (describing mis-posting of recipe
for homemade hand sanitizer during COVID-19 shortages).
Show Me the Science-When & How to Use Hand Sanitizer in Community Settings, CTRS. FOR
179.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: HANDWASHING,

https://www.cdc.gov/handwashing/show-me-the-science-

hand-sanitizer.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Q6N5-L2JM] ("CDC recommends washing
hands with soap and water whenever possible because handwashing reduces the amounts of all types of germs
and chemicals on hands. But if soap and water are not available, using a hand sanitizer with at least 60% alcohol
can help you avoid getting sick .... "); see also Ferris Jabr, Why Soap Works, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/BJ4
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/health/soap-coronavirus-handwashing-germs.html
N-SMWQ] (explaining how soap and hand sanitizer interact with germs).
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periods of time with no access to soap and water. Unable to assess, sort, or prioritize risks, consumers did the only thing left: buy everything and prepare for
anything. This dichotomy demonstrates the shortcomings of human risk perception.

This kind of hoarding behavior and the resulting shortages led to a suboptimal distribution of goods and services in society, somewhat akin to a tragedy
of the commons.'80 Nowhere was this clearer than with the hoarding of surgical
masks. "With coronavirus popping up in the United States, some ... beg[a]n
buying face masks as a form of protection .... "1 81 However, in the early days
of the outbreak, these masks were desperately needed in hospitals.1 82 For example, one "intensive-care nurse in Illinois was told to make a single-use mask last
for five days." 183 One hospital "had started storing dirty masks in plastic containers to use again later with different patients."1 84 Another Washington doctor,
who was "trying to make her small stock last, [was] spraying each mask with
alcohol after use, until it br[oke] down."18 5 In the early days of the COVID-19
outbreak, it seemed irrationality was the rule not the exception. 186
But hoarding behaviors are not the only example of irrational thinking surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. Some completely ignored the risk by putting
their head in the sand or actively downplaying the risk. 7 After governments and
businesses began requiring masks in public, there were many who flat out refused
to comply.18 8 Many COVID-19 deniers, some who believed the pandemic was a

180. "The tragedy of the commons is an economics problem in which every individual has an incentive to
consume a resource, but at the expense of every other individual -- with no way to exclude anyone from consuming..... [I]t results in harmful over-consumption[,] .... under investment[,] and ultimately [total] depletion of
the resource." Tragedy of the Commons, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/t/tragedy-of-the-commons.asp [https://perma.cc/9GGD-Rw8H.
181. Leah Asmelash, The Surgeon General Wants Americans to Stop Buying Face Masks, CNN: HEALTH
(Mar. 2, 2020, 9:38 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/29/health/face-masks-coronavirus-surgeon-generaltmd/index.html [https://perma.cc/L5E8-NWD6]; Jerome M. Adams (@SurgeonGeneral), TWITTER (Feb. 29,
2020, 4:08 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/202003021 15642/https://twitter.com/SurgeonGeneral [https://

perma.cc/RS3F-GM86].
182. Mariel Padilla, 'It Feels Like a War Zone': Doctors and Nurses Pleadfor Masks on Social Media,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/hospitals-coronavirus-ppe-shortage.html

[https://perma.cc/5F6v-VB4L].
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Coronavirus Myths, Rumors, and Misinformation, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (June 30, 2020),
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/coronavirus/articles/coronavirus-myths-rumors-misinformation.html
[https://perma.cc/CJB2-RZNG] (chronicling the healthcare myths that circulated in the early days of the outbreak). For a study linking social media use to misinformation and subsequent risk misperception, see Aengus
Bridgman et al., The Causes and Consequences of COVID-19 Misperceptions: Understandingthe Role ofNews
and Social Media, 1 SPECIAL ISSUE COvID-19 & MIS[NFORMATION 1, 2-6 (2020).
187. See, e.g., Nexstar Media wire, 14 in Texas Family Get COVID-19 After Virus Denier'sParty; 1 Left
Dead and Another on Life Support, Fox 8 NEwS (July 31, 2020, 5:06 AM), https://fox8.com/news/coronavirus/14-in-texas-family-get-covid-19-after-virus-deniers-party-1-left-dead-and-another-on-life-support/
[https://perma.cc/8D3D-7SDZ].
188. Paul Ruehl, Coronavirus: There Really Are Mask Deniers out There. I Hadto Spend a Weekend with
Them, USA TODAY (July 27,2020,9:49 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2020/07/26/coronavirus-covid-19-wear-mask-prevention-virus-column/5494984002/ [https://perma.cc/F9XX-PTTQ].
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conspiracy against the Trump campaign, would go on the contract the virus themselves. 189 Relatedly, perceptions regarding the risk of COVID-19, a natural dis90
aster, was strongly correlated with political affiliation.1 In one poll forty percent of Republicans felt the death count was inflated while only seven percent of
Democrats agreed. 191 Another poll revealed that Democrats were 12.9% more
192
In a ralikely to get vaccinated against COVID-19 than their counterparts.
tional world, one's political affiliations would be as relevant to assessing the risk
of a virus as it is to assessing the probability that Punxsutawney Phil will see his
shadow in a given year.
Governments and institutions also exhibited signs of irrational thought-processes early in the outbreak. It became taboo to discuss the value of a statistical
life ("VSL").193 Phrases like "[w]e cannot let the cure be worse than the problem
itself," unobjectionable as a matter of logic, quickly became politically controversial. 194 In a statement to the press, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo responded to concerns of small business owners that the prophylactic measures
would destroy their livelihoods.1 95 He stated that "[his] judgment is, do whatever
is necessary to contain this virus, and then we will manage the consequences
afterwards." 196 Nevada Governor Steve Sisolak put it more bluntly when he said,
"You can't put a value on human life."1 97 Likewise, a March 2020 study from
the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team recognized the importance of
understanding the secondary "ethical and economic implications" of prophylactic measures.98 However, the team ultimately decided considerations of such
factors were outside the scope of its study when recommending "population189. See, e.g., supra note 187; Ashley Collman, A Man Who Thought the Coronavirus Was a 'Scamdemic'
Wrote a Powerful Essay Warning Against Virus Deniers After He Hosted a Party and Got His Entire Family
Sick, INSIDER (July 28, 2020, 6:51 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-texas-conservative-

thought-hoax-before-infection-2020-7 [https://perma.cc/5GTF-MSRP].
190. Republicans, Democrats Move Even Further Apart in Coronavirus Concerns, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June
25, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/06/25/republicans-democrats-move-even-further-apartin-coronavirus-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/6VMY-Y75Q].
191. Margaret Talev, Axios-Ipsos Coronavirus Index, Week 8: Second-Guessing the Death Toll, AXIOs
6 7
5
83-9b 1 e
(May 5, 2020), httpsJ/www.axios.com/axios-ipsos-coronavirus-week-8-5a1947d5-9850-4e58-9

6fdclb.html [https://perma.cc/Y7TL-CF7Q].
192. Jennifer Kates, Jennifer Tolbert & Kendal Orgera, The Red/Blue Divide in COVID-19 Vaccination
Rates, Kaiser Family Foundation (Sept. 14,. 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/the-red-blue-divide-incovid-19-vaccination-rates/ [perma.cc/FFM4-WYNZ].
193. See John Sadler, "Can't Put a Value on Human Life": Sisolak Mulls Options in Managing Virus
Spread, LAS vEGAS SUN (July 9, 2020, 12:25 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2020/jul/09/cant-put-valuehuman-life-sisolak-virus-options/ [https://perma.cc/2J4H-7Q7Y].
194. Brett Samuels & Rebecca Klar, Trump: "We Can't Let the Cure Be Worse than the Problem Itself',
HILL (Mar. 23, 2020, 8:11 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/488965-trump-hints-at-changesto-restrictions-we-cant-let-the-cure-be-worse [https://perma.cc/E3LJ-379A].
195. Bloomberg Markets and Finance, Most NY Complaints Over Bars Being Closed, Gov. Cuomo Says,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZvNEjB-urA [https://perma.cc/N3Qw-CUP4].

196.

Id.

197.

Sadler, supra note 193.

198.

NEIL M. FERGUSON ET AL., IMPERIAL COLL. COVID-19 RESPONSE TEAM, IMPACT OF NONPHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS (NPIS) TO REDUCE COvID- 19 MORTALITY AND HEALTHCARE DEMAND 4

(Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Impe-

rial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YUP-P8CW].
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wide social distancing combined with home isolation of cases and school and
university closure" on and off for "18 months or more." 199
Failing or refusing to consider the secondary loss of life caused by prophylactic measures is a kind of finite, short-term thinking that is dangerous. 2 0
Measures such as shelter-in-place contributed to the worst annualized drop in
Gross Domestic Product on record, "even outstripping the Great Depression in

its scale." 201 As a rule of thumb, some experts maintain that for every one percent
increase in unemployment, 40,000 people die.202 While the true level of mortality caused by unemployment and recession is disputed, 203 mortality is not the
only factor policymakers should consider. For every life taken by unemployment
and economic depression, several more are destroyed. 204 People lose livelihoods,
homes, pensions, savings, marriages, and more. 205 Failure to perceive and incorporate these substitute sources of risk in the prophylactic decision-making process had potential to magnify rather than minimize the effects of the virus.
Most recently, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy issued a tweet celebrating the first long-term care resident vaccination in the state.2 06 That individual
was a 103-year-old woman.207 At the time the vaccine was in short supply and
essential workers, disproportionately people of color, more than half her age

199. Id. at 15.
200. See Scott Wallsten, Thomas M. Lenard & Kip viscusi, "Kip Viscusi on the Value of a StatisticalLife
and Coronavirus" (Two Think Minimum), TECH. POL'Y INST. (April 30, 2020), https://techpolicyinstitute. org/2020/04/30/kip-viscusi-on-the-value-of-a-statistical-life-and-coronavirus-two-think-minimum/
[https://perma.cc/CGN3-D67P](quoting Kip viscusi, the father of statistical life evaluation, discussing prophylactic measures: "Ifwe're really saving a million lives through social distancing, multiply that by $10 million a
life. You're talking about $10 trillion in terms of benefits. That's a lot of benefits ... but sooner or later we're
going to have to be phasing down and the government's going to have to start picking their shots.").
201. Matthew Brown, Fact Check.- U.S. GDPDrop in 2020's Second QuarterIs the Worst in Modern His-

tory, USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2020,9:40 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/08/08/factcheck-u-s-quarterly-gdp-drop-worst-modem-history/5569089002/ [https://perma.cc/X67P-GR8W].
202. For an informative discussion on this figure, see More or Less, Fact Checking the Big Short, BBC, at
4:05 (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/p03kpvk2 [https://perma.cc/369v-D64J]; see also Rising Unemployment Causes Higher Death Rates, Yale Researcher Shows, YALENEWS (May 23, 2002),
https://news.yale.edu/2002/05/23/rising-unemployment-causes-higher-death-rates-new-study-yale-researchershows [https://perma.cc/5K3U-M3GB]; The Social Costs of Unemployment: Hearing Before the Joint Econ.

Comm., 96th Cong. 1 (1979).
203.

Alex McKechnie, How Is It Possible that Joblessness Could Kill You, but Recessions Could Be Good

for Your Health?, DREXELNOW (July 24, 2014), https://drexel.edu/now/archive/2014/July/UnemploymentStudy/ [https://perma.cc/DA65-v6HF].
204. See id.
205. wallsten et al., supra note 200 ("If you're imposing a huge economic cost, there's also a health loss
associated with that. So health is on both sides of the analysis.").

206.

Phil Murphy (@GovMurphy), TWfITER (Dec. 28, 2020, 8:26 AM), https://twitter.com/GovMur-

phy/status/1343564072722325504?ref _src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E134

3564072722325504%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&refurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nbcphiladelphia.com
%2Fnews%2Fcoronavirus%2Fphil-murphy-coronavirus-new-jersey-vaccines%2F2648348%2F

cc/AGv4-2CLA].
207. Id.

[https://perma.
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were dying. 208 As a society, we should question whether this vaccination was
truly a cause for celebration.2 09 Difficult decisions require difficult discussions.
' It is not inhumane or immoral to make decisions based on the value of a
21 1
statistical life21 0 or the value of a quality-adjusted-life-year ("QALY"). Quite
the opposite, it shows a concern for all human lives, not just the most visible
ones. The fact of the matter is that governments and agencies have been putting
a value on human life for decades, and society has collectively benefited as a
result.21 2 Moreover, we individually put a price on life all the time when we pur21
chase life insurance, sacrifice safety for price, or take unnecessary risks. 1 While
VSL analysis overwhelmingly supported shelter-in-place and other quarantine
2 14
measures, inevitably the costs of those measures will outstrip the benefits. Decisionmakers must be prepared to deal with that eventuality by engaging in VSL
and QALY analyses. Additionally, QALY analysis would have forced New Jersey health officials to compare the value of gaining a few more years for a 103year-old against potentially saving the life of a 40-something-year-old essential
worker with comorbidities resulting in part from their membership in an underprivileged class. Decisionmakers cannot shy away from these difficult realities
because of a discomfort with valuing life.
The purpose of this section has not been to minimize or trivialize the risk
posed to society by the COVID-19 outbreak. The virus clearly represents a substantial source of risk, and dealing in counterfactuals presents difficulties. However, irrational purchasing behavior and decisional procedures perfectly highlight the pervasiveness of risk misperception in our society. The price society
pays for this misperception could compound the costs exacted by the virus alone.

208. See Samantha Artiga, Latoya Hill & Sweta Haldar, COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by Race/Ethnicity:
Current Data and Changes Over Time, KFF (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/covid-19-cases-and-deaths-by-race-ethnicity-current-data-and-changes-over-time/
[https://perma.cc/X6TA-7BSJ]; Celine McNicholas & Margaret Poydock, Who are Essential Workers?, ECON
POLICY INST. (May 19, 2021), https://www.epi.org/blog/who-are-essential-workers-a-comprehensive-look-attheir-wages-demographics-and-unionization-rates/ [https://perma.cc/A2BG-8FBN].
209. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough & Jan Hoffman, The Elderly vs. Essential Workers: Who Should Get the
Coronavirus Vaccine First?, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/05/health/covidvaccine-first.html [https://perma.cc/BUX4-GXR3]; Kylie Quinn, Why We Should Prioritise Older People When
PM), https://theconversation.com/why-weWe Get a COVID Vaccine, CONVERSATION (Nov. 15, 2020, 41:53
432
[https://perma.cc/HT2X-BMHY].
8
should-prioritise-older-people-when-we-get-a-covid-vaccine-1
210. See sources cited supra note 209.
211. See Luis Prieto & Jose A Sacristan, Problems and Solutions in Calculating Quality-Adjusted Life Years
(QALYs), 1 HEALTH & QUALITY LIFE OUTCOMES 1, 1 (2003) ("Since health is a function of length of life and
quality of life, the QALY was developed as an attempt to combine the value of these attributes into a single index
number. The QALY calculation is simple: the change in utility value induced by the treatment is multiplied by
the duration of the treatment effect to provide the number of QALYs gained.").
212. See Wallsten et al., supra note 200 ("[T]ypically about once every year or once every two years, the
press discovers, oh my god, they're valuing lives and does a big stir in terms of the controversy. And then it
settles down when they hear how big the number is. So when they find out that their lives are being valued at a
quite high number, people get less upset.").
213. See Lives vs. the Economy, NPR (Apr. 15, 2020, 4:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/835571843

[https://perma.cc/QJ3J-YBN6].
214.

See Wallsten et al., supra note 200.
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III. PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK PERCEPTION: WHY HUMANS MISPERCEIVE
TECHNOLOGY

There are several psychological factors that contribute to risk misperception in humans. People rely on a mixture of cognitive crutches, heuristics, and
emotional appraisals to navigate the risks of everyday life.2 15 A brief mental exercise demonstrates one of these cognitive shortcuts. Take a moment and picture
a bird in your mind. Chances are you pictured a sparrow, robin, or crow instead
of a long-wattled umbrellabird or an albatross. But why did your brain, without
any conscious thought, select the bird that it did? Why does the baseball player
refuse to wash his lucky socks? 216 Why do Americans perceive Black men as
more dangerous than white men? 217
The answer to these questions lies in the mental shortcuts and biases our
brain engages in every single day. 2 18 In some cases, they are actually rather successful in assisting humans to process informational inputs quickly. 219 In the
course of everyday life, one is more likely to encounter a sparrow or a robin, and
faith in a lucky pair of socks can sometimes lead to a better outing. But these
heuristics and biases are fallible. 220 When you inject complexity into mental processes, such as processing race in America, these mental shortcuts often operate
as devastating shortcomings. 221 They can cause humans to act irrationally and
systematically misperceive risk.222 As the world humans inhabit continues to increase in complexity, one can expect risk misperception to worsen.223

215. See The Psychology of Risk Perception, HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER 6 (June 2011), https://
www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/the-psychology-of-risk-perception [https://perma.cc/K9ZB-3H8Q];
see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4; Calandrillo, supra note 8.
216. See Seattle Mariners, 2011-Lucky Charm, YOuTUBE (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.youtube.
com/watchv=s4ayLdsJyw0&list=PLXOQiAf6mS6AR50gcm7WpiY-9LrnL1iQO&index=122
[https://perma.
cc/3XY6-GL3J].
217. See John Paul Wilson, Kurt Hugenberg & Nicholas O. Rule, RacialBias in Judgments ofPhysicalSize
and Formidability:From Size to Threat, 113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 59, 74 (2017) ("Non-Black perceivers overestimated young Black men as taller, heavier, stronger, more muscular, and more capable of causing
physical harm than young White men."). Nowhere was this unfortunate bias more prevalent than in the disparate
responses by law enforcement to Black Lives Matter protestors in the Capitol and majority-white Trump supporters terrorizing the seat of government. See Nicole Chavez, RiotersBreached US CapitolSecurity on Wednesday. This Was the Police Response When It Was Black Protesters on DC Streets Last Year, CNN (Jan. 10, 2021,
11:30
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/07/us/police-response-black-lives-matter-protest-us-capitol/index.html [https://perma.cc/CFT8-MKMP].
218. See Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751 (2003).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Wilson et al., supra note 217, at 74 ("Critically, these size and harm perceptions predicted the
extent to which perceivers saw force as justified against hypothetical suspects of crime.").
222. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1131.
223. There are "emerging views of decision making which indicate that decision making is based often on
experiential 'gut' feelings rather than rational analysis." Nancy Rhodes & Kelly Pivik, Age and GenderDifferences in Risky Driving: The Roles ofPositive Affect andRisk Perception,43 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
923, 929 (2011). "[T]hese simple gut-level decisions that are encouraged by evolution appear to make people
stupid in the modern world under unpredictablecircumstances, and they encourage unhealthy risk taking rather
than discourage it." valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making:
Implicationsfor Theory, Practice, and PublicPolicy, 7 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 4 (2006) (emphasis added).
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This Article does not, and cannot, survey all of the different heuristics and
biases that might affect risk misperception. The purpose, rather, of this Part is to
identify a select few that have an inextricably intertwined connection to certain
immutable characteristics of emerging technology, causing a general aversion to
such technology in humans. In short, the below heuristics and biases are the driving forces behind systemic technological risk misperception. Compounding the
issue, these mental shortcuts are themselves interconnected. Humans often combine heuristics and stack inference upon inference to paint different layers of a
risk portrait. 224 Only by identifying and understanding the cognitive and psychological factors that contribute to misperception, can humans then begin the process of reducing their impact on decision-making processes.
The PrecautionaryPrincipleas an OverarchingBackdrop to Regulatory

A.

Decision-making

The Precautionary Principle operates as the decisional canvas upon which
humans employ their heuristic and cognitive shortcuts to paint a portrait of the
risks they face in life.2 25 With the post-industrial "emergence of increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable but possibly catastrophic risks ... ,"
societies began to formally incorporate the Precautionary Principle into their decisional processes. 226 There is no singular definition of the Precautionary Principle; rather, it occupies a spectrum ranging from its weak form to its strong
form. 227 At one end, "[t]he most cautious and weak versions suggest, quite sensibly, that a lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be grounds for refusing
to regulate." 228 At the strong end, "regulation is required whenever there is a
possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even if the supporting evi229
dence is speculative and even if the economic costs of regulation are high."
From these polemical definitions, the parameters of the precautionary continuum
can be deduced: (1) the burden of proving the absence or presence of risk;
(2) who bears that burden; (3) the scale and probability of the potential harm;
(4) whether regulation is required or merely encouraged; and (5) the scale of the
23 0
regulatory remediation.
As the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge & Technology has noted, "the [Precautionary Principle] is a strategy to cope with scien23
tific uncertainties in the assessment and management of risks." 1 It is inherently
224.
225.

See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1131.
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1043 (2003).

226.

WORLD COMM'N ON ETHICS OF SCI. KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE PRECAUTIONARY

PRINCIPLE, UNESCO 7 (Mar. 2005), https://www.eubios.info/UNESCO/precprin.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YRFHN95] [hereinafter COMEST, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE].
227.

For a discussion of common elements amongst the different forms of the Precautionary Principle, see

id. at 13-14.
228.

Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1012.

229.

Id. at 1018.

230. See id. at 1014 (citing Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making under Uncertainty, in 20 RESEARCH INLAW AND ECONOMICS 71, 78 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002)).
231. COMEST, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 226, at 8.
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conservative, creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of the status quo. Its

adoption has "marked a shift from post-damage control (civil liability as a curative tool) to the level of a pre-damage control (anticipatory measures) of
risks." 232 Although sources trace the origin of its modern form to the 1970s, the
Precautionary Principle is really a regulatory endorsement of more colloquial
thinking evident in age-old adages such as "better safe than sorry." 233
Examples of the Precautionary Principle in regulatory decision-making are
everywhere. It has become nearly ubiquitous in international environmental regulation. 234 Given the scientifically uncertain nature of the dangers posed by climate change and pollution, many environmental conventions incorporate some
form of the Precautionary Principle.23 5 The Precautionary Principle helps explain
why millions of law abiding citizens are subjected to full-body scans at airport
across the country every single day. 236 It is the same principle that influenced Dr.
Kelsey's decision to reject inconclusive data regarding the safety of thalidomide. 37 It is also the same principle that spurs overreaction to the low risk of
school shootings. 238 Like any tool of decision-making, the Precautionary Principle must be wielded with precision.
Professor Cass Sunstein, a long-time critic of the Precautionary Principle

and preeminent American expert on behavioral economics, has "suggested that
the weak versions of the Precautionary Principle are unobjectionable and important." 239 It states a "truism" that combats the kind of decision-making that
would require an overwhelming showing of harm before taking action to mitigate
risk.240 He warns against trivializing this function, citing a poll revealing onefifth of Americans believe no costly action should be taken against global warming until we are assured of its actuality. 241 In other words, the weak form of the

232. Id. at 7.
233. See id. at 9; Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1004.
234. Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1005, 1005 n.6.
235. See, e.g., Second InternationalConference on the Protection of the North Sea: Ministerial Declaration
Callingfor Reduction of Pollution, 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 835, 838 (1988) ("Accepting that, in order to
protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach
is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been
established by absolutely clear scientific evidence."); United Nations Conf. on Env't & Dev., Rio Declaration
on Env't and Dev., 31 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 874, 879 (1992). ("In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."); Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., Commc'n from
the Comm'n on the PrecautionaryPrinciple,EUR. UNION 1, 7 (2000) (The precautionary principle applies "where
scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain and where there are indications that the possible
effects on the environment, or human, animal or plant health may be potentially dangerous and inconsistent with
the chosen level of protection.").
236. See Jay Wagner, TSA Year in Review: A Record Setting 2018, TRANSP. SEC. ADMiN. (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2019/02/07/tsa-year-review-record-setting-2018 [https://perma.cc/Q5NU-L9AY].
237. See supra Section ILHA.l.
238. See supraSection Il.B.3.
239. Sunstein, supra, note 225, at 1016.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1016-17.
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Precautionary Principle is useful in combatting the kind of decision-making that
would require an absolute certainty of harm to trigger a regulatory intervention.
In its strong form, however, Professor Sunstein argues that the Precaution2 42
ary Principle is paralyzing and ultimately useless as a tool of decision-making.
"In some cases, regulation eliminates the 'opportunity benefits' of a process or
activity, and thus causes preventable deaths." 43 This phenomenon was evident
in the example of FAA-mandated child restraints discussed in Part II. In that
case, regulation would have reduced one source of risk (child injuries on airplanes) but given rise to a substitute source of risk (increased motor vehicle
travel). "The point is ... [that] in its strongest form, [the Precautionary Principle]
2
is offended by regulation as well as by nonregulation." 44 "This is a common
situation, for opportunity benefits and substitute risks are the rule, not the exception."

245

Take, for example, the case of nuclear arsenals. The global stockpile of
nuclear arms, ninety percent of which is held by the U.S. and Russia, is enough
to end human life several times over.24 6 The mere existence of these weapons
247
Relying on a
creates a risk of nuclear terrorism or even nuclear holocaust.
strong Precautionary Principle, several members of the medical community have
248
Going even further, one
called for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.
group has declared nuclear proliferation to "be among the most urgent of all
global public health priorities."249 As Professor Sunstein cautions, however, a
250
faithful Precautionary Principle analysis must cut both ways. The existence of
nuclear weapons has contributed to an unprecedented nuclear peace among
world superpowers. 2 51 If war is merely "a continuation of political intercourse,
carried on with other means," then politics for its own sake must always stop
short of nuclear war. 25 2 Put differently, while an abolition of these weapons
might reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe, a substitute risk of conventional
world war would arise. For mutually assured destruction to serve its deterrent

242.

Id. at 1035.

Id. at 1023.
Id at 1024.
Id. at 1025.
246. See Kelley Christensen, More Harm than Good Assessing the Nuclear Arsenal Tipping Point, MICH.
TECH (June 13, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.mtu.edu/news/stories/2018/une/more-arm-than-good-assessingthe-nuclear-arsenal-tipping-point.html [https://perma.cc/Pv38-KQ2W].
247. See id. ("Playing out a hypothetical scenario, the researchers explain that if the U.S. used 100 nuclear
weapons against China's most populous cities, initial blasts would likely kill more than 30 million people.").
248. See, e.g., Our Mission, INT'L PHYSICIANS PREVENTION NUCLEAR WAR, https://www.ippnw.org/pro(last visited
grams/nuclear-weapons-abolition/abolition-of-nuclear-weapons-campaign-material-and-research
Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/M44W-W45L] (calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons).
249. See, e.g., Ira Helfand, Lachlan Forrow & Jaya Tiwari, Nuclear Terrorism, 324 BRITISH MED. J. 356,
243.

244.
245.

358 (2002).
Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1054-58.
Cf Robert Rauchhaus, Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach, 53 J.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 258 (2009).
252. CARL VON CLAUSEWIrz, ON WAR 87 (Michael E. Howard trans., Peter Paret ed., 1989).
250.
251.
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purpose, it must be exactly that: assured. 253 Therefore, the strong Precautionary
Principle would also seem to counsel in favor of a nuclear triad possessing
enough redundancies and weapons to destroy the world several times over. Consequently, a faithful application of the strong Precautionary Principle is paralyzing in this situation because it cautions against both choices. In other words, even
if one agreed that it is always better to be safe than sorry, rarely is it clear what
is safe and what is sorry.
Sunstein's critique of the Precautionary Principle is nuanced. Again, in its

weak form, it is unobjectionable. 254 The absence of a causal link should not always preclude regulatory intervention. In its strong form, it is paralytic and thus

cannot be relied upon. 255 Notwithstanding the paralytic effects, however, it still
has "widespread appeal." 256 Herein lies the key to Professor Sunstein's critique:

how can groups, like the physicians above, continue to embrace the strong Precautionary Principle when it cautions against both regulatory intervention and
nonintervention? The answer lies in the fact that individuals "can regard themselves as 'precautionary' only if they blind themselves to many aspects of riskrelated situations and focus on a narrow subset of what is at stake. "2 7 This blindness or selective risk awareness is possible because of cognitive biases. 258 In
situations where the strong Precautionary Principle should be paralyzing because
of the existence of substitute risks, humans, subconsciously relying on cognitive
biases, selectively apply the Precautionary Principle to some sources of risk
while completely ignoring others. 2 59 "Simply as a logical matter, no society can
be highly precautionary with respect to all risks." 260
The Precautionary Principle (and the cognitive biases that inform its application) is magnified in the context of emerging technologies. The strong form
Precautionary Principle should almost always be paralytic in this context. On the
one hand, it would require government regulation of any emerging technology
that might pose a risk to health or safety. Since the nature and scope of risks
posed by a new piece of technology often suffer from a significant degree of
uncertainty, the Precautionary Principle could be invoked in favor of regulating
nearly every emerging technology. On the other hand, emerging technologies
offer potential opportunity benefits. Technology saves lives. Consequently, the
Precautionary Principle would caution against any government interference that
253. See WARGAMES (MGM Studios Inc. 1983) (In the classic '80s flick WARGAMES, Mathew Broderick's
character "trained" a computer by having it repeatedly play tic-tac-toe in order to make it realize that launching
a nuclear attack guaranteed mutual destruction with no winner (and the newly educated computer therefore
aborted the attack)); see also Ben Gilbert, Elon Musk Says He's Terrifiedof AI Taking over the World and Most
Scared of Google's DeepMind AI Project, INSIDER (July 27, 2020, 11:49 AM), https://www.business
insider.com/elon-musk-maureen-dowd-ai-google-deepmind-wargames-2020-7
[https://perma.cc/U96U-6Pw8]
(comparing Google AI to WARGAMES).
254. Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1016.
255. Id. at 1035.

256.

Id. at 1018.
Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-CulturalRisk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005).
257.
258.
259.

See Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1036.
See id at 1029.

260.

Id.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

626

[Vol. 2022

might inhibit the development of lifesaving technologies. Thus "it [should]
stand[] as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything in between." 26 1 The remainder of this section, however, demonstrates how the cognitive biases that inform applications of the strong Precautionary Principle selectively amplify the perceived risks posed by emerging technology in a
particularized manner, tipping the decisional scales in favor of regulation. That
is, cognitive biases, working through the Precautionary Principle, consistently
manifest as a bias against emerging technologies, resulting in suboptimal regulatory decision-making.
Neophobia: Fearofthe Unknown Versus Dreadof the Unfamiliar

B.

It is easy to see how a human penchant for fearing unknown risks could
influence the selective application of the Precautionary Principle. The Precautionary Principle is an attempt to account for scientific uncertainties. A fear, or
even discomfort, associated with uncertainty could lead one to over-perceive any
threat associated with that uncertainty. 262 This cognitive bias is also exhibited in
common proverbs, such as "better the devil you know than the devil you don't."
In the context of emerging technologies, fear of the unknown takes on a different,
amplified meaning. The risks posed by emerging technologies are likely to be
overperceived because, not only are they unknown or uncertain, they are unfamiliar and alien. 263 In other words, "familiarity may breed contempt: common
actions and activities are often not perceived as especially risky compared with
the unfamiliar or the novel."2 64 Thus, the very nature of emerging technologies
results in a particularized kind of phobia: technophobia-a subset of neophobia. 26 5 As an example, while the risk associated with a tornado or hurricane
may be uncertain or unknown, we accept that these kinds of natural disasters are
somewhat familiar to us, even if we aren't directly affected by them. So-called
"murder hornets," on the other hand, engender a more dreadful kind of fear because they are alien and thus are not easily comparable to other, more familiar,
natural disasters. 266 Consequently, the selective application of the Precautionary
Principle to emerging technologies is influenced not only by a fear of the unknown but by a dread of the unfamiliar.
Neophobia is well-documented. A risk perception study in Korea revealed
that individuals over-perceived the risk posed by the 2002 SARS outbreak relative to the risk posed by influenza because of the unfamiliarity of the SARS risk
Id. at 1028..
Id at 1036.
263. Martina Raue et al., The Influence of Feelings While Driving Regular Cars on the Perception and
Acceptance ofSelf-Driving Cars, 39 RISK ANALYSIs 358, 359, 361 (2019) ("For example, objectively risky ac261.
262.

tivities such as alcohol consumption or driving, which are perceived as non-dreadful and familiar, are also perceived as not very risky by the public.").

264.

Id

265. See Khasawneh, supra note 2, at 98.
266. See, e.g., Anthony Laudato, Invasion! The Threat from Asian Giant Hornets, CBS NEWS (July 26,
[https://
2020, 9:07 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/invasion-the-threat-from-asian-giant-hornets/

perma.cc/3C7R-YTPQ}.
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factors. 267 One Canadian study of sexual behavior found that individuals were
more likely to downplay the risks of unprotected sex with a hypothetical new
partner who they perceivedas more "familiar," even where familiarity provided
no "information about the sexual health history for any of the hypothetical partners." 268 This study indicates that it is not only familiarity in the objective sense,
but in the subjective as well, that determines risk perceptions. 269 This suggests
that the brain can be lulled into feelings of familiarity even in the absence of true
familiarity. Other studies have noted that perceptions of familiarity regarding an
ethnic cuisine are negatively correlated with perceptions of risk posed by that
cuisine.270 As some of these observers have explained,271 concomitant to a fear
of the unfamiliar is the mere-exposure effect, a "well-established finding that
people evaluate a stimulus more positively after repeated exposure to that stimulus." 272

Technophobia as a form of neophobia is likewise well-documented. 273
Much of the research surrounding this phenomenon was inspired by a wave of
computer-phobia in the 1980s when the age of personal computers dawned.274 It
can be defined as "an irrational fear and/or anxiety that individuals form as a
response to a new stimulus that comes in the form of a technology .... "275 From
a logical standpoint, "the adoption of novel products [or technology] is typically
associated with risk taking and uncertainty because accepting novelty implies
leaving the realm of the familiar." 276 A literature review of empirical research
regarding the impact of technophobia on business concluded that "the introduction of technological changes can provoke emotional and cognitive reactions.
This fear and anxiety may manifest itself in the form of a phobia-induced by

267. See Seonghoon Hong & Alan Collins, Societal Responses to FamiliarVersus UnfamiliarRisk: Comparisons ofInfluenza and SARS in Korea, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 1247, 1254-55 (2006).
268. Shayna Sparling & Ken Cramer, Choosing the Danger We Think We Know: Men and Women's Faulty
Perceptions of Sexually TransmittedInfection Risk with Familiarand Unfamiliar New Partners,24 CANADIAN
J. HUM. SExuALrrY 237, 241 (2015).
269. See id.
270. See, e.g., Hyewon Youn & Jong-Hyeong Kim, Is Unfamiliarity a Double-Edged Sword for Ethnic
Restaurants?, 68 INT'L J. HOSP. MGMT. 23, 24-25 (2018); Ja Young Choe & Mi Sook Cho, FoodNeophobiaand
Willingness to Try Non-TraditionalFoodsfor Koreans, 22 FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 671, 676 (2011).
271. See Sparling & Cramer, supra note 268, at 241; Choe & Cho, supra note 270, at 676.
272. Pieter van Dessel, Gadtan Mertens, Colin Tucker Smith & Jan De Houwer, The Mere Exposure Instruction Effect: Mere Exposure InstructionsInfluence Liking, 64 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 299, 299 (2017). See
generally Robert B. Zajonc, AttitudinalEffects ofMere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1, 1 (1968).
Cf D. W. Rajecki, Zajonc, Cockroaches, and Chickens, c. 1965-1975: A Characterizationand Contextualization, 2 EMOTION REV. 320,326 (2010); Thomas D.G. Burgess II & Stephen M. Sales, AttitudinalEffects of "Mere
Exposure": A Reevaluation, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 461, 462 (1971).
273. See Adrienne LaFrance, When People Feared Computers, ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2015), https://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/when-people-feared-computers/388919/
[https://perma.cc/

636L-A66M].
274. Id.
275. Khasawneh, supra note 2, at 98.
276. Peter H. Feindt & P. Marijn Poortvliet, Consumer Reactions to Unfamiliar Technologies: Mental and
Social Formation of Perceptions and Attitudes Toward Nano and GM Products, 23 J. RISK RSCH. 475, 478

(2020).
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2
technology; technophobia." 77 In turn, that phobia "might push employees to
avoid the new technology." 278 Moreover, "technophobia d[oes] not fade away
with time. In fact, new technologies bring new and unique facets of technophobia . . .. 279
Technophobia's influence on risk perception and decision-making is costly.
Indeed, looking only at its effects on the workplace, it has been "estimated that
technophobia might be responsible for no less than $4.2 billion[] in wages, in the
United States alone." 280 Further research suggests that aversion to unfamiliar
281
technology, a heuristic in its own right, is informed by other heuristics. In effect, the absence of familiarity results in a blank canvas of sorts, which, out of
discomfort, humans subconsciously seek to fill with other heuristics. Turning to
some of these other heuristics, it is clear how they comingle and compound one
another to bias individuals against unfamiliar technology.

C.

The Availability Heuristic

When sorting through unknown or unfamiliar risks, humans rely on the
282
The brain attempts to
availability heuristic to manufacture risk probabilities.
produce a proxy estimate of the probability of an event occurring or the frequency of a class based on the ease with which prior examples can be recalled
from stored recollections. 283 For example, the reason an individual might think
of a crow or a sparrow when asked to picture a bird is likely because those examples are the ones frequently encountered, and thus are the most available for
the brain to recall. "The availability heuristic illuminates the operation of the
Precautionary Principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen and
284
It helps explain why the Precautionary Princiwhy others will be neglected."
ple is invoked against emerging technologies when instead it should be paralytic
due to substitute costs.
The availability heuristic can operate as a convenient means of estimating
the risks of everyday life. 285 "[It] is an ecologically valid clue for
navigating
and
the judgment of frequency because, in general, frequent events are easier to recall
286
In this sense, it would appear that the availor imagine than infrequent ones."
foregoing discussion of unfamiliar risk. In
the
with
odds
at
is
heuristic
ability
277. Odai Y. Khasawneh, Technophobia Without Boarders: The Influence of Technophobia and Emotional
Intelligence on Technology Acceptance and the Moderating Influence of Organizational Climate, 88 CoMPUTs.
HUM. BEHAV. 210, 210 (2018) (citing Marjorie A. Cambre & Desmond L. Cook, Computer Anxiety: Definitions,
Measurement, and Correlates, 1 J. EDUC. COMPUTING RSCH. 37 (1985)).
278. Khasawneh, supra note 2, at 94.

279.

Id. at 98.

280. Id. at 93. (citing victoria B. Elder, Ella P. Gardner & Stephen R. Ruth, Gender and Age in Technostress: Effects on White-Collar Productivity, 3 GOV'T. FIN. REV. 17 (1987)).
281. See Feindt & Poortvliet, supra note 276, at 476.
282. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207, 208 (1973).
283. See id.
284. Sunstein, supra note 257, at 87.
285. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 282, at 208.

286.

Id. at 209.
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general, one might expect that familiar risks would be overestimated by the availability heuristic since they are the most available, whereas infrequent and unfamiliar risks would be underestimated because they are unavailable. "However,
availability is also affected by various factors which are unrelated to actual frequency. . . . [S]uch factors will affect the perceived frequency of classes and the
subjective probability of events." 287 These manipulative factors are especially
prevalent in the context of emerging technologies. When they are allowed to bias
human perception, "the availability heuristic can lead to serious errors in terms
of both excessive fear and neglect." 288
Any number of factors which affect memory recall can lead to a biased
application of the availability heuristic. 289 The most obvious factors are salience
and vividness. 290 They contribute to availability because the more salient or vivid
an experience, object, or story is, the more likely it is to trigger and capture attentional resources in the brain and for longer periods of time. 291 "Greater time
in thought means more rehearsal, and more rehearsal means greater memorial
availability." 292 In the context of tobacco regulation, graphic warning labels incorporating salient and vivid depictions of the adverse consequences of tobacco
consumption have been shown to result in better recall of the warning messages.29
The underlying nature of emerging technologies renders them particularly
susceptible to a biased application of the availability heuristic. In particular,
"[c]ontextual factors such as ... novelty ... or media coverage increase the salience of an event." 294 Demonstrating the interrelated nature of different cognitive biases in risk assessment, novelty and unfamiliarity contribute to availability
because new and unique objects or events are likely to capture attentional resources.295 As previously discussed, emerging technologies are, by definition,
novel and unfamiliar. 29 6
With respect to media coverage, "[a]vailability, produced by 'a particularly
vivid case or new finding that receives considerable media attention,' play[s] a

287. Id.
288. Sunstein, supra note 257, at 88.
289. See id. at 77.
290. See id. ("If a particular incident is cognitively 'available'-both vivid and salient-then people will
have a heightened fear of the risk in question.").
291. See valerio Santangelo, Forcedto Remember: When Memory Is Biased by Salient Information, 283
BEHAV. BRAIN RSCH. 1, 4 (2015).
292.
RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 55 (1980) ("Thus, more vivid information is likely to be more available not merely because it is more
interesting and hence likely to be stored. More vivid information normally will prompt more rehearsal and more
elaborate and effective encoding processes, both of which should improve later availability.").
293. See An-Li Wang, Zhenhao Shi, victoria P. Fairchild, Catherine A. Aronowitz & Daniel D. Langleben,
Emotional Salience of the Image Component FacilitatesRecall of the Text of Cigarette WarningLabels, 29 EUR.
J. PUB. HEALTH 153, 156 (2018).
294. Olivier Dessaint & Adrien Matray, Do ManagersOverreact to SalientRisks? Evidencefrom Hurricane
Strikes, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 97, 98 (2017).
295. See id.
296. See supra Section III.B.
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While the technology usually recovers from early struggles, negativity bias-in
which "bad information is processed more thoroughly than good"-helps explain why individuals perceive negative media hype as more salient than positive
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hype.

297.

See Sunstein, supra note 257, at 90.

298.

See ALEXANDER LINDEN & JACKIE FENN, UNDERSTANDING GARTNER'S HYPE CYCLES: STRATEGIC

ANALYSIS REPORT, GARTNER RSCH. 5 (2003), http://www.ask-force.org/web/Discourse/Linden-HypeCycle-

2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL3X-JUYB].
299. Id.
300. Id. at 8.
301. Roy F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer & Kathleen D. Vohs, Bad Is Stronger than
Good, 5 REv. GEN. PSYCH. 323, 323 (2001). Media sensationalization of "murder hornets" offers a prime example of negative media hype and public reactions to it. See, e.g., Spencer K. Monckton, How British Columbia
and Washington State Are Stopping the Spread of Asian Giant Hornets, CONVERSATION (July 8, 2020,
11:50 AM), https://theconversation.com/how-british-cohumbia-and-washington-state-are-stopping-the-spreadof-asian-giant-homets-140518 [https://perma.cc/6LH9-2DZ2] ("Panic-stricken headlines about 'murder hornets'
are thankfully mostly behind us. The nickname may have staying power, but it is certainly unearned."); Natalie
O'Neill, What Happenedto the Murder Hornets Expected to Wreak Havoc in the US?, N.Y. POST (July 9, 2020,
[https://
2:50 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/07/09/what-happened-to-the-murder-horets-invading-the-us/
perma.cc/QE2Q-KAM6] ("Unfortunately a lot of people are killing bumblebees thinking they are Asian giant
hornets, ... [t]hat's doing more harm than good."); Kaila Lafferty, 2,000+ Reports of PotentialAsian Giant
Hornets Sent to Washington Department of Agriculture, KING 5 NEWS (July 23, 2020, 7:09 PM),
https://www.king5.com/article/tech/science/environment/asian-giant-over-2000-reports-of-potential-murder2
hornet-sightings-submitted-to-the-department-of-agriculture/ 81-456f2dd9-4fac-46bc-9acf-6e14a422a7ef
[https://perma.cc/238K-KDMF] ("Almost all of [the 2,000+ sightings] turned out to be false reports.").
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FIGURE 1: THE HYPE CURVE
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Finally, the nature of the substitute costs associated with regulating emerging technologies also renders them particularly susceptible to availability bias.3
Sometimes a certain risk, said to call for precautions, is cognitively available, whereas other risks, including the risks associated with regulation itself, are not.... In many cases where the precautionary principle seems to
offer guidance, the reason is that some of the relevant risks are available
while others are barely visible. 303
For example, the brain can easily understand the causal link between mandatory
infant restraints in airplanes and reduced injuries related to flying with infants. 304
The causal pathway the brain must navigate, however, to establish a link between
mandatory infant restraints on airplanes and increased traffic deaths requires several more inferential steps. Understanding the risks associated with overregulating or not adopting an emerging technology also requires more inferential steps
because they come in the form of lost opportunity benefits; lives that could have
been saved or improved. On the other hand, the costs associated with adopting
an emerging technology are much more visible because they represent a departure from the status quo.
Novelty, media hype, and cost visibility represent only a few of the routes
through which the availability heuristic can skew perceptions against an emerging technology in distinct and particularized modes. 30 As shown below, there
are numerous other interrelated cognitive biases that affect the availability heuristic and the Precautionary Principle.
302.

Cf Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1043.

303.

Id.

304.
305.

See supra Section l.B.2.
See Dessaint & Matray, supranote 294, at 98.
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InformationalAccess

Decision-makers are only as good as the information they possess. When
an emerging technology threatens to disrupt an industry,306 preexisting industry
players often face the threat of significant pecuniary losses. 307 Understandably,
these self-interested parties respond by discrediting or obstructing the emerging
technology. 308 Modern corporate structures and increased fidelity to the shareholder have contributed to this zealous safeguarding of market share and profit309
Some of these defense tactics include
ability, even at the cost of human life.
the usual and effective lobbying and political spending that influence high level
decision-making. 310 However, in a democratic society filled with individual decisionmakers, industry manipulation of the accessibility, pace, and content of information in order to distort public perceptions of risk can be just as effective at
311
preventing market disruption.
As a general proposition, established market players are likely to react negatively to any developments, tech-related or otherwise, that threaten their bottom
lines. The tobacco industry's response to the discovery of a conclusive link between its products and various cancers is a prime example of the depths to which
31
corporations will stoop to protect profitable products. In addition to the typical
lobbying and politicking, the tobacco industry engaged in informational warfare

306. "Disruptive technology can be defined as '... a technology that changes the bases of competition by
changing the performance metrics along which firms compete.' Munan Li, Alan L. Porter & Arho Suominen,
Insights into Relationships Between Disruptive Technology/Innovation and Emerging Technology: A Bibliometric Perspective, 129 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 285, 286 (2018) (quoting J.L. Bower & C.M.
Christenson, Disruptive Technologies: Catchingthe Wave, 73 HARv. Bus. REv. 43, 43-53 (1995)).
307. Two readily available examples of industry leaders suffering losses as a result of emerging technology
include BlackBerry, Ltd. and Kodak, Inc.; see Sam Gustin, The FatalMistake that Doomed BlackBerry, TIME
[https://
(Sept. 24, 2013), https://business.time.com/2013/09/24/the-fatal-mistake-that-doomed-blackberry/

(Jan. 18, 2012, 9:56 AM),
Chunka Mui, How Kodak Failed, FORBES
2 7
4 7
6
[https://perma.cc/85RL
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2012/01/18/how-kodak-failed/# ea a 516f
perma.cc/83J2-XVT2];

-WWTK].
308. See, e.g., Yussuf Saloojee & Elif Dagli, Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on
Health, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 902, 902-03 (2000); Samantha L. Thomas, Jennifer David, Melanie
Randle, Mike Daube & Kate Senior, Gambling Advocacy: Lessons from Tobacco, Alcohol and Junk Food, 40
AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. PUB. HEALTH 211, 211 (2016).
309. See Saloojee & Dagli, supra note 308, at 902 (2000). ("Questioned about the ethics of targeting the
world's poor, a manager at [a major tobacco company] replied: 'It would be stupid to ignore a growing market.
I can't answer the moral dilemma. We are in the business of pleasing our shareholders."'); see also SIMON SINEK,
THE INFINITE GAME 70-90 (2019) (discussing the negative effects of shareholder primacy).
310. Just how effective industry lobbying and political donations are has been studied extensively in the
context of the leadup to the 2008 Financial Crisis. See generally Atif Mian, Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, The
PoliticalEconomy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 373 (2013) (examining the
effectiveness of special interest lobbying in the buildup to the subprime mortgage crisis); Deniz Igan, Prachi
Mishra & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful ofDollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis, 26 NBER MACROECONOMICS
ANN. 195 (2012) (analyzing the effect of lobbying effort on lenders' stock returns).
311. See, e.g., Saloojee & Dagli, supra note 308, at 903 (describing tobacco manufacturers that "have engaged in a vigorous effort to silence critics distort science, influence public opinion, control public policy, and
coordinate their strategy on litigation").
312. See id.
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on a scale the business world had never seen. 313 In response to the carcinogenic
discovery, the industry launched a campaign to suppress negative research. 3 14
Furthermore, it established a research front in the form of the Tobacco Industry
Research Council. 315 "Instead of supporting genuine scientific research into the
problems, it spent millions of dollars publicizing research purporting to prove
that tobacco did not cause cancer." 3 16 Following decades of misinformation and
obfuscation-and unnecessary deaths-public perception of risk eventually
caught up with reality.3 1 7 Even still, the industry persisted in its disinformation
campaign when the risk posed by second-hand smoke was later revealed. 318
These tactics continue to this day. 319 Importantly, the "industry's strategy does

not require winning the debates it manufactures. It is enough to foster and perpetuate the illusion of controversy in order to muddy the waters around scientific
findings that threaten the industry." 320 In other words, the mere implantation of
a seed of doubt regarding risk levels can be enough to delay accurate public perception of risk by decades. Taking note, other businesses-including fast food
restaurants, alcohol producers, and casinos-have launched similar disinformation campaigns with comparable success.32 1
With respect to emerging technologies, the American automobile industry

has waged similar disinformation campaigns against new products proven to increase motor vehicle safety. 322 The decades-long battle over seatbelts and airbags
represent a paradigmatic example. 323 In his revolutionary book, Unsafe at Any
Speed, Ralph Nader accused the American auto industry of ignoring technology
that increased safety. 324 Worried that an accurate assessment of the risk posed by
their cars would hurt their bottom line, the big auto companies fomented disinformation. 325 Like the tobacco industry, the American auto industry established
several research and safety foundations whose real purpose was to deflect public
risk perception away from dangerous design towards dangerous drivers. 32 They
313.

See WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE WITH TOBACCO CONTROL
4-5 (2008),

https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241597340 [https://perma.cc/4UFN-ANFM] [hereinafter
WHO,
Tobacco Report]; Saloojee & Dagli, supra note 308, at 903.
314. See WHO, Tobacco Report, supra note 313, at 10.
315. Saloojee & Dagli, supra note 308, at 903.
316. Id
317. See id
318. See id. at 903-04.
319. See WHO, Tobacco Report, supranote 313, at 10.
320. Saloojee & Elif Dagli, supra note 308, at 903.
321. See Thomas et al., supra note 308, at 211.
322. Clyde Haberman, Lessons from the Pastfor a Future in Smart Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/15/us/lessons-from-the-past-for-a-future-in-smart-cars.html
[https://perma.
cc/5SEZ-KKCM].
323. Id
324. Id; see also The New York Times, Searchingfor the Crashless Car, YOUTUBE (Sept. 15,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qxuqBdiQtRw&t=6s [https://perma.cc/FHE4-GWvQ] [hereinafter New
York Times, CrashlessCar].
325. See Frank W. Geels & Caetano C.R. Penna, Societal Problems andIndustry Reorientation: Elaborating the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) Model and a Case Study of Car Safety in the USA (1900-1995), 44
RSCH. POL'Y 67, 78 (2015).
326. See id at 76 (discussing the Automobile Safety Foundation, the NSC, etc.).
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pumped out information claiming consumers did not want increased safety and
327
They
inaccurate assessments of the costs associated with safety measures.
who
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big auto companies that public
reality, they persisted in publicly stifling safety innovation while privately de329
veloping the technology themselves. Following decades of disinformation and
unnecessary death, car manufacturers have performed a complete about-face,
3 30
competing to win the title of safest car on the road.
Another paradigmatic example of information manipulation is the National
331
Football League's ("NFL") suppression of cutting-edge concussion research.
3 32
Bennet Omalu, portrayed by actor Will Smith in the film Concussion, famously discovered the neurodegenerative disease chronic traumatic encephalo-3
33
pathy ("CTE")-originally thought to be confined to boxers-in NFL players.
Naively, Dr. Omalu "thought NFL doctors would be pleased when they [learned
of his discovery]."3 3 4 However, like the tobacco and auto industries, the NFL had
3
its own counter-research arm, the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury committee.
Though none of its leading members were neuropathologists, they did their best
36
In communications with acto discredit Dr. Omalu's work and his reputation.
ademics, reporters, and the public, the NFL dismissed his work as "speculative,"
33 7
Moreover, they "'publish[ed] an un"flawed," and "not appropriate science."
precedented series of papers, several of which were rejected by peer reviewers
338
Once
and editors and later disavowed even by some of their own authors."'
to
began
they
undeniable,
the
the NFL realized they could no longer deny
327. New York Times, CrashlessCar, supra note 324; see also Geels & Penna, supra note 325, at 79.
328. Haberman, supra note 322 ("General Motors, then the dominant car manufacturer, reacted to Mr.
Nader's charges with the far-from-brilliant tactic of spying on him and trying to lure him into compromising
positions.").
329. See Geels & Penna, supranote 325, at 78.
330. See id. at 69; see also 2021 Top Safety Picks, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, https://www.iihs.org/
ratings/top-safety-picks (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/YNR3-9MBY]. The automotive industry
has also waged information warfare against technology that could make cars safer for the environment, and ultimately, human life. The industries resistance to the catalytic converter is a representative example. See Steven
Cohen, The 'Can't-Do'Approach of the American Auto Industry, HUFFPOST (Mar. 27, 2017, 7:48 AM), https://
www.huffpost.com/entry/the-cant-do-approach-of-the-american-auto-industryb_58d8fb3de4b~f633072b3979

[https://perma.cc/JYR6-C6CJ].

331. See Jeanne Marie Laskas, Bennet Omalu, Concussions, and the NFL: How One Doctor ChangedFootball Forever,GQ (Sept. 14, 2009) https://www.gq.com/story/nfl-players-brain-dementia-study-memory-concus-

sions [https://perma.cc/6GTS-N54V].
332. See CONCUSSION (Columbia Pictures 2015); see also Laskas, supranote 331.
333. See generally Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football
League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 128 (2005).
334. Laskas, supranote 331.

335.

Id.

336.

See id.

337.

Id.

338. See The NFL Tried to Intimidate Scientists Studying the Link Between ProFootball and Traumatic
Brain Injury, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/nfl-tried-intimidate-scientists-studying-link-between-pro-football-and-traumatic-brain [https://perma.cc/S48K-4A55] (quoting
MARK FAINARU-wADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL 6 (2013)).
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suppress the undeniable. 339 A 2016 congressional study accused the NFL of
"work[ing] to improperly influence ... government research, trying to steer [a]
study toward a doctor with ties to the league. .. .340 After the NFL realized it
could not influence the study, it pulled the funds it had promised.34 1 Sadly, while
the NFL was busy obfuscating and sowing the seeds of doubt, a generation of
young children signed up for youth football completely unaware of just what
they were signing up for. 42 Of his groundbreaking research, Dr. Omalu had the
following to say: "There are times I wish I never [did it]. It has dragged me into
worldly affairs I do not want to be associated with. Human meanness, wickedness, and selfishness. People trying to cover up, to control how information is
released."343

Whether motivated by corporate greed, fiduciary duty to the shareholder,
or the structure of executive compensation, the ability of industry players to wage
informational warfare against emerging technologies has a significant impact on
public perception of associated risks.
Even giant tech companies that once cut
their teeth on innovation are exhibiting similar defensive behaviors. 345 They have
been accused of suppressing and stifling emerging technologies by taking advantage of mergers and acquisitions, borderline copyright infringement, and disproportionate economies of scale (e.g., Facebook's strong-armed acquisition 346

339.

Id.

340. John Branch, N.F.L. Triedto Influence ConcussionResearch, CongressionalStudy Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(May 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/sports/football/nfl-tried-to-influence-concussion-research-congressional-study-finds.html [https://perma.cc/ZHR4-TEBQ].
341. See id.
342. Laskas, supra note 331 ("'You realize you can blow out your knee, you can even break your neck and
become paralyzed. Those are all known risks. But you don't sign up to become a brain-damaged young adult."').
343. Id. (emphasis added).
344. It is important to note that industry is not the only source capable of information manipulation. The
example of anti-vaccination propaganda demonstrates how any group threatened by an emerging piece of technology can sow the seeds ofdoubt in the face of overwhelming evidence. See generally Anna Kata, Anti-Vaccine
Activists, Web 2.0, and the PostmodernParadigm-AnOverview of Tactics and Tropes Used Online by the AntiVaccination Movement, 30 vACCINE 3778 (2012); Azhar Hussain, Syed Ali, Madiha Ahmen & Sheharyar
Hussain, The Anti-Vaccination Movement: A Regression in Modern Medicine, CUREUs, July 3, 2018, at 1; Matthew Motta, Steven Sylvester & Timothy Callaghan, Why Vaccine Opponents Think They Know More than Medical Experts, TEX. MED. ASS'N (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=48227
[https://perma.cc/HYZ4-TSKv]. However, this section primarily focuses on industry manipulation because that
form of manipulation affects emerging technology in a more particularized manner.
345. See Alexis C. Madrigal, Silicon Valley Abandons the Culture that Made It the Envy of the World,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/01/why-silicon-valley-andbig-tech-dont-innovate-anymore/604969/ [https://perma.cc/KDN5-WVUA].
346. See Tyler Sonnemaker, New Text Messages Show Kevin Systrom Worried About Mark Zuckerberg
Going into 'DestroyMode' If He Didn't Sell to Facebook, INSIDER (July 29, 2020, 6:05 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/instagram-cofounder-feared-zuckerberg-destroy-mode-facebook-acquisition-texts-2020-7
[https://perma.cc/4WX4-9A95] ("Facebook's acquisition of Instagram has since come under scrutiny from regulators and politicians who argue it amounted to anti-competitive practices.").
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E.

Control

As emerging technology promises to make life increasingly automated, it
also becomes exposed to another particularized form of cognitive bias. While
350
those fears are inmuch of the fear associated with automation is economic,
35 1
Fear of losing
control.
losing
of
extricably bound to a technophobic fear

347. See Taylor Hatmaker & Devin Coldewey, Secret Documents from US Antitrust Probe Reveal Big
Tech's Plot to Control or Crush the Competition, TECHCRUNCH (July 31, 2020, 1:07 PM), https://tinyurl.com/2926s353 [https://perma.cc/Y99G-BJ6J] ("Aggressive price cutting by [Amazon] forced the [competition] out of business, allowing it to be snapped up and integrated.").
348. See, e.g., Angus Loten, Large Tech Companies Preparefor Acquisition Spree, WALL ST. J. (May 21,
2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/large-tech-companies-prepare-for-acquisition-spree-115900
53401 [https://perma.cc/P88M-MVAL]; Christopher Mims, Not Even a Pandemic Can Slow Down the Biggest
Tech Giants, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/not-even-a-pandemic-canslow-down-the-biggest-tech-giants-1 1590206412 [https://perma.cc/B8MS-MVC7]; American Tech Giants Are
Making Life Tough for Startups, ECONOMIST (June 2, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/
Jack
[https://perma.cc/4DXY-D4K4];
2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-making-life-tough-for-startups
Are Withering Away, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2020,
Kelly, Big Tech Continues to Get Bigger While Smaller Rivals
4
12:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/0 /15/big-tech-continues-to-get-bigger-while-othersare-withering-away/#2959c51e7fd2 [https://perma.cc/ES4B-QFZM].
349. See, e.g., Alan Patricof, The Big Tech Companies Are Smothering Small Start-Ups, FIN. TIMES (Apr.

10, 2019),

https://www.ft.com/content/dcaf8fl6-5ae2-11e9-840c-5307374255

5

9

[https://perma.cc/CDY5-

4M6S]; Rodrigo Ochigame, The Invention of "EthicalAI," INTERCEPT (Dec. 20, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/12/20/mit-ethical-ai-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/7G7L-UDFE]; Cathy O'Neil,
Big-Data Algorithms Are Manipulating Us All, WIRED (Oct. 18, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
2016/10/big-data-algorithms-manipulating-us/ [https://perma.cc/H6YC-CRX3]; Kirsten Grind, Sam Schechner,
Robert McMillan & John West, How Google Interferes with Its Search Algorithms and Changes Your Results,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-interferes-with-its-search-algorithms-and-changes-your-results-11573823753 [https://perma.cc/VK9W-V7AE].
350. The potential of this economic fear of automation to magnify perceived risks associated with emerging
technology should not be dismissed. A 2018 Pew Research Center poll reveals a high proportion of individuals
fear job automation will result in significant unemployment and widen the gap between the rich and the poor.
See Richard Wike & Bruce Stokes, In Advanced andEmerging Economies Alike, Worries About Job Automation,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/09/13/in-advanced-and-emergingeconomies-alike-worries-about-job-automation/ [https://perma.cc/7GWE-XQLX]. Moreover, the public seems
more concerned with the negative aspects of automation than the positive aspects. Id. One can expect this focus
on the negative downsides of job automation to adversely skew perceptions of risk.
351. See Terry Goodrich, More than a Third ofStudy ParticipantsFear Technology that Could Lead to Job
Loss More than They Do Romantic Rejection, PublicSpeaking and Police Brutality, BAYLOR U. (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.baylor.edu/mediacommunications/news.php?action=story&story=178582 [https://perma.cc/2RK3-

59ZX].
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control, just like any phobia, can inflate a decisionmaker's perception of associated risks. 352
In general, humans experience feelings of anxiety, fear, and helplessness
when they perceive a lack of control over their environment.3 5 3 In one study,
subjects were more likely to under-perceive the discomfort associated with a
painful stimulus when they were provided with illusions of control over that
stimulus. 354 Those who fear flying consistently rate lack of control as significant
source of their phobia.355
In the context of automation and artificial intelligence ("AI"), pop culture

hits such as I, Robot, the Matrix, and Stanley Kubrick's cult classic 2001: A
Space Odyssey are provocative and arousing precisely because the each tap into
a human discomfort with surrendering control to technology. 35 Philosophers
have made careers out of proselytizing Singularitarianism, the notion that humans will lose control of Al through an exponentially accelerating chain reaction
of machine learning. 357 A simple internet search reveals a plethora of resources
aimed at counseling employees through their automation-induced technophobia. 358 Intuitively speaking, it is easy to imagine that this anxiety associated with
ceding control to automation and artificial intelligence would alter the manner in
which humans perceive and interreact with emerging technologies, resulting in a
misapplication of the Precautionary Principle against that technology.
But it is not just that a fear of losing control influences how a decisionmaker
might apply the strong Precautionary Principle. It also influences whether an individual will engage in the fallacy of the strong Precautionary Principle in the
first place. 359 Indeed, the paralytic nature of the strong Precautionary Principle

352. See The Psychology ofRisk Perception, supra note 215; see also viscusi, Valuing Risk ofDeath from
Terrorism and NaturalDisasters, supranote 8, at 211 ("Terrorism risks involve a substantial element of dread.
They are also involuntary risks outside the individual's control. The dramatic nature of the 9/11 attacks surely
contributes to the vivid character of the risks, which may be influential as well.").
353. See Susan Mineka & Kelly A. Kelly, The RelationshipBetween Anxiety, Lack of Control and Loss of
Control, in STRESS, PERSONAL CONTROL AND HEALTH 163, 171-78 (Andrew Steptoe & Ad Appels eds., 1989).
For an extensive discussion of the fear of losing control, see generally STRESS PERSONAL CONTROL AND HEALTH
(Andrew Steptoe & Ad Appels eds., 1989), supra.
354. See Kenneth S. Bowers, Pain, Anxiety, andPerceived Control, 32 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH.

596, 600-01 (1968).
355. See Frank H. Wilhelm & Walton T. Roth, Clinical CharacteristicsofFlight Phobia, 11 J. ANXIETY
DISORDERS 241, 257 (1997); Lucas van Gerwen, Sociodemographicand ClinicalCharacteristicsofPeople Who
Self-Refer for Treatment for Their Fearof Flying, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FEAR OF FLYING 1, 9
(Robert Bor & Lucas van Gerwen eds., 2003).
356. See Ezio Di Nucci & Filippo Santoni de Sio, Who's Afraid of Robots? Fearof Automation and the
Ideal of DirectControl (2014) (unpublished manuscript).
357. Albert R. Antosca, Singularitarianism and the New Millennium: Techno-Theology in the Transhumanist Age of Re-Enchantment 105-06 (Apr. 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Salve Regina University); see also Collin
Braun, The Mortals: A Comparative Analysis of Christianity and Singularitarianism on the Subject of Eternal
Life 8 (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate University).
358. See, e.g., How Techno-Phobia Can Harm Your Business, MEDIUM (Aug. 23, 2017), https://medium.com/@Etech7/how-techno-phobia-can-harm-your-business-bd2576f0af32
[https://perma.cc/5G7CY4TB].
359. Cf Lane Wallace, The Illusion of Control, ATLANTIC (May 26, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/05/the-illusion-of-control/57294/ [https://perma.cc/DPR2-8QMQ].
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itself produces the anxious feeling of losing control. 360 Like a cat to a warm beam
of sunlight, humans subconsciously seek out comforting illusions of control as a
means of cocooning themselves from the realities of indeterminacy. 361 This is
part of the reason people engage in irrational hoarding behaviors (e.g., toilet paper shortages as a response to COVID-19) in response to uncontrollable stimuli,
such as natural disasters. 36 2 When an analysis under the Precautionary Principle
offers no advice because it is paralyzing-as is so often the case with
emerging
technology-the resulting decisional limbo can produce feelings of anxiety.
Because no decision is definitively advised, there is no control to be had. This is
a form of cognitive dissonance in which the Precautionary Principle supports
both action and inaction.3 4 "The existence of dissonance, being psychologically
uncomfortable, motivates the person to reduce the dissonance and leads to avoidance of information likely to increase the dissonance. The greater the magnitude
365
Conseof the dissonance, the greater is the pressure to reduce dissonance."
quently, in the face of dissonance caused by a paralytic Precautionary Principle,
humans, seeking illusions of control, will not only contrive a precautionary answer when the principle offers none, but they will likely choose the option that
will itselfprovide them with the greatest illusion of control. That is, regulation,
creating a proverbial double whammy.
F.

Age

36 6
That is, they
In general, as humans age they become more risk averse.
367
There are numerous reasons for this
tend to inflate the risks they perceive.
phenomenon. Some are inherent to aging itself.368 For example, humans generally experience a spike in economic risk aversion around the typical age of retirement, "probably reflect[ing] the shift toward fixed income assets after retirement." 369 Moreover, as physical health and motor function begin to decline,
everyday tasks, such as crossing the street or taking a shower, become more

Id (detailing the discomfort that can arise when quantitative analysis breaks down).
See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCH. 311, 325 (1975).
See Colleen Kirk -& Kena Johnson, Panic Buying Amid Covid-19 Fears, N.Y. INST. TECH. (Apr. 2,
2020), https:/www.nyit.edu/box/features/panicbuyingamidcovid19_fears [https://perma.cc/CV8J-T8FH].
360.

361.
362.
363.

Cf Wallace, supra note 359.

364. Cognitive Dissonance can be defined as the "psychological conflict resulting from incongruous beliefs
and attitudes held simultaneously." Cognitive Dissonance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cognitive%20dissonance (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) [https://perma.cc/PC9F-7G4Q].

365. Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and an Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory, in CoGNr-vE DISSONANCE: REEXAMINING A PIVOTAL THEORY IN
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 3 (Eddie Harmon-Jones ed., 2019) (emphasis added).
366. This is not always the case. For example, studies suggest that the elderly are equally likely to engage
in risky behaviors such as gambling and unsafe sex. See Emily M. Bonem, Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Richard

Gonzalez, Age Differences in Risk: Perceptions, Intentions and Domains, J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING

1 (2015)

("[A]ge differences in risk preferences may vary across [different risk] domains and may result from differing
motivations.").

See id.
See William B. Riley Jr. & K. victor Chow, Asset Allocation and Individual Risk Aversion, 48 FIN.
ANALYTICS J. 32, 32 (1992).
369. Id; see also Rhodes & Pivik, supra note 223.
367.
368.
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risky. 370 In that sense, increased risk perception and aversion amongst the elderly
are justified by the fact that life does indeed become riskier as one ages. These
factors inherent to aging, however, cannot completely account for the drastic increase in risk perception that aging adults often experience. These factors, themselves external to human cognition, nonetheless inform a broader cognitive attitude that the world is riskier than it actually is; particularly so in relation to
emerging technology. 371 This is unfortunate considering the fact that emerging
technology promises to make life much less risky and much more comfortable
and enjoyable for senior citizens.37 2 It is also concerning because the average age
of democratic decisionmakers in the U.S. is set to increase as "[t]he aging of baby
boomers means that within just a couple decades, older people are projected to
outnumber children for the first time in U.S. history." 373
If risk aversion among senior citizens were entirely rational, one would expect a perfect correlation between an increase in an actual aging-related risk and
the aversion towards that risk. However, studies measuring increased aversion to
non-aging-related risks demonstrate that this phenomenon cannot be explained
solely by an actual increase in risks facing the elderly. 374 One such study sought
to build upon prior research indicating that information processing speed and
other important variables, such as working memory, necessary for complex decision-making deteriorate in humans as they age. 37 "[Their] findings confirmed
the notion ... that older adults demonstrate risk aversion in the risky choice context in which risk-seeking would be a more effective strategy .. ." as a result of
this cognitive decline. 376 One of the ways that older adults subconsciously compensate for this loss in cognition is "through selective engagement in cognitive
resources. Older adults may conserve resources ... limiting both the quantity
and complexity of the information to which they attend." 377 In other words, older
adults possess a generalized aversion to risk.

370. See Bonem, et al., supra note 366, at 1; see also Martin Halek & Joseph G. Eisenhauer, Demography
ofRisk Aversion, 68 J. RISK & INS. 1, 10 (2001).
(finding evidence that "suggests that being age 65 or older significantly increases one's [economic] risk aversion
by 95.19 percent to 114.15 percent").
371. Why Some Older People Are Rejecting Digital Technologies, SCI. DAILY (Mar. 12, 2018), https://

www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/03/180312091715.htm [https://perma.cc/RDH8-B53E].
372. Eleftheria Vaportzis, Maria Giatsi Clausen & Alan J. Gow, OlderAdults Perceptions of Technology
and Barriersto Interactingwith Tablet Computers: A Focus Group Study, 8 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1, 1 (2017).
373.

Older People Projectedto Outnumber Childrenfor First Time in U.S. History, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU

(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2018/cbl8-41-population-projections.html
[https://perma.cc/RvX4-9vwJ] (internal quotations removed).
374. See, e.g., Debra E. Henninger, David J. Madden & Scott A. Huettel, ProcessingSpeed and Memory
Mediate Age-Related Diferences in Decision Making, 25 PSYCH. & AGING 262, 262 (2010); James F. Cavanagh
et al., Individual Differences in Risky Decision-MakingAmong Seniors Reflect IncreasedReward Sensitivity, 6
FRONTIERS NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1 (2012); Jonathan J. Rolison, Stacey wood & Yaniv Hanoch, Risky Decision
Making in Younger and Older Adults: The Role ofLearning, 27 PSYCH. & AGING 129, 129 (2012).
375. See Maciej Kogcielniak, Klara Rydzewska & Grzegorz Sedek, Effects ofAge and InitialRisk Perception on Balloon Analog Risk Task: The Mediating Role of ProcessingSpeed and Needfor Cognitive Closure, 7
FRONTIERS PSYCH., Apr. 2016, at 8.

376.

Id

377.

Id. at 3.
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The implications of this generalized aversion for emerging technology are
crystal clear. Analyzing the risks associated with complex emerging technologies
requires dedicating a significant amount of cognitive resources towards processing intricate information. 378 As has been explained, understanding the risks
associated with a piece of technology is cognitively easier than understanding
the substitute costs that regulation would bring about. A generalized risk aversion
resulting from a decline in cognitive resources would undoubtedly affect perceptions of emerging technology in a negative manner.
This aversion to risk in general is amplified by a particularized aversion to
new technology in older adults. As the brain ages, it becomes less neuroplastic.379 When this occurs, individuals begin to lose the ability to adapt to new
stimuli and learn new cognitive and motor skills.380 As the old adage suggests,
"you can't teach an old dog new tricks." 38 ' While this is, of course, an overstatement, any child who has had to re-explain how the television remote functions
to a parent or grandparent is well-acquainted with this phenomenon. This reduced ability to adapt to new technology results in anxiety, which, in turn, causes
a technophobic aversion. 382 This irrational phobia serves only to increase the risk
aversion older adults feel towards emerging technology, thus inflating perceptions of risk.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL RISK MISPERCEPTION

As explained in Part III, technological risk misperception is a distinctive
form of misperception because humans are systematically predisposed to overperceiving the risks associated with a new piece of technology. The consequences and costs of technological risk perceptions are also unique because they
come in the form of lost benefits and opportunities: lives not saved, lives not
improved, profits not made. 383 The insidious costs associated with a blind allegiance to the status quo are often not cognitively available to decisionmakers

378. See id. at 2.
379. See id. ("The scientific literature indicates a clear and marked monotonic decrease in basic fluid cognitive abilities (such as processing speed, working memory capacity, and fluid intelligence) from early adulthood
through middle age to old age, and this is responsible for decreased performance in various cognitive tasks.")
(internal citations omitted).
380. See Lisa Pauwels, Sima Chalavi & Stephan P. Swinnen, Aging and Brain Plasticity, 10 AGING 1789,
1790 (2018); Denise C. Park & G6rard N. Bischof, The Aging Mind: Neuroplasticity in Response to Cognitive
Training, 15 DIALOGUES CLIN. NEUROSCIENdE 109, 109 (2013).
381. See Pauwels et al., supra note 380.
382. See Dina Di Giacomo, Jessica Ranieri, Meny D'Amico, Federica Guerra & Domenico Passafiume,
Psychological Barriers to Digital Living in Older Adults: Computer Anxiety as Predictive Mechanism for Technophobia, 9 BEHAV. SCIs. 96, 100 (2019); Galit Nimrod, Technophobia Among Older Internet Users, 44 EDUC.
GERONTOLOGY 148, 157-59 (2018); Mairdad Hogan, Age Diferences in Technophobia: An Irish Study, in
INFORMATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 117, 127 (Chris Barry, Kieran Conboy, Michael Lang, Gregory

wojtkowski, & Wita Wojtkowski eds., 2009).
383. See Steve Calandrillo, Jason Oh & Ari Webb, Deadly Drones? Why FAA Regulations Miss the Mark
on Drone Safety, 23 STAN. TECH L. REV. 182, 185 (2020).
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because, as Ike and Tina Turner put it, "you can't miss nothing that you never
had." 384
When technological risk misperception leads decisionmakers to shun
emerging technology in favor of maintaining the status quo, the world collectively suffers as a result.385 Three contemporary examples of technological risk
misperception-drones, self-driving cars, and artificial intelligence-demonstrate the prohibitive yet subtle costs associated with technological risk misperception.
A.

The Costs of FearingDrones

There is no dispute that unmanned aerial vehicles, better known as drones,
will revolutionize the human experience for the better. 386 They have a proven
ability to save lives and deliver necessary goods and services to vulnerable and
remote demographics.387 Yet Americans fear them. 388 This irrational fear has led
to an irrational response. Rather than reflecting a commonsense weighing of the
costs and benefits associated with drone technology, the American regulatory
response to this promising new technology is a story of systemic risk misperception. 389 The result is a reduction of overall social welfare and a stifling of technological advancement. 39 0
It was not always the case that drone regulation was informed by irrational
fear. There was a time when FAA drone "guidelines were lenient, for ... the
agency's main purpose was to regulate manned passenger aircraft .... "39
384. IKE & TINA TURNER, YOU CAN'T MiSs NOTHING THAT You NEVER HAD (Sonja Records 1964).
385. See Calandrillo et al., supra note 383, at 185.
386. See, e.g., Drone Technology Uses and Applicationsfor Commercial, Industrialand MilitaryDrones
in 2020 and the Future, INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2021, 10:15 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/drone-technologyuses-applications [https://perma.cc/QJ2L-WZ7F]; Daisy Carrington & Jenny Soffel, 15 Ways Drones Will
Change Your Life, CNN (Nov. 18, 2013, 5:23 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/03/business/meet-yourfriendly-neighborhood-drones/index.html [https://perma.cc/JMB8-W3BN] (detailing how drone technology will
revolutionize human existence).
387. See, e.g., Nina Strochlic, The Surprising Ways Drones Are Saving Lives, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2017/06/explore-drones-for-good/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/38ZA-4SM8]; Jack Karsten & Darrel M. West, How Emergency RespondersAre UsingDrones
to Save Lives, BROOKINGS (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/12/04/how-emergency-responders-are-using-drones-to-save-lives/ [https://perma.cc/NN3X-WAS6]; see also Alex Williams, The
Drones Were Made for This Moment, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/23/
style/drones-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/NN3X-WAS6] (describing how drones rose to the vital challenge of unmanned delivery of essential goods and services during the Covid-19 outbreak).
388. See David Nassar, New Poll Reveals Americans' High Hopes For-But High Fears of--Drones,
HAWTHORN GRP. (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.hawthorngroup.com/press-release/drone-poll/ [https://perma.cc/
4KY6-4N4M] (finding an overwhelming majority of Americans believe that drone use will become prevalent
but a similarly overwhelming majority fear such an eventuality). Notably, age plays a significant role in predicting aversion to drone technology. See Paul Hitlin, 8% ofAmericans Say They Own a Drone, While More than
Half Have Seen One in Operation, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
7 2
8
201 /1 /19/ -of-americans-say-they-own-a-drone-while-more-than-half-have-seen-one-in-operation/
[https://perma.cc/8GVX-AA9E] ("Older Americans often have substantially more negative-and less permissive-attitudes toward drones than do younger adults.").
389. Calandrillo et al., supra note 383, at 233.
390. Id. at 230.
391. Id. at 185.
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Unfortunately, this "American honeymoon with drone technology" came crashing down in the 2000s when rising public fears put pressure on the FAA to adopt
39
To be sure, drones are a tool capable of abuse
an aggressive regulatory stance.
3
39
no one can deny that they do represent a
sense,
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just like any other.
394
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However,
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factors,
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however,
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minor
The FAA can waive some of the
drones.
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applications.
drone
waivers are typically inadequate for most immediate
The starting place for any rational discussion of drone regulation is the fact
that, in stark contrast to other means of transporting goods and services, there
have been zero reported deaths caused by drone related accidents in the United
States.4 02 The costly line-of-sight regulation does little to increase public safety.
Nominally speaking, it is meant to "reduce collisions by requiring operators to
logical
see their drone directly. ... "403 While this requirement might offer some
4
appeal to the layman, it is ultimately not grounded in rational thought. 04 "Drone
visoperation through a live camera feed provides drone operators with a clearer
405
Moreual of their drones to better see and avoid obstacles in a drone's path."
the need
over, advancements in collision-avoidance technology have obviated
406
for an operator to keep a drone within his or her visual line of sight. In other

392.
393.

Id. at 186.
See id. at 227.

394.

Id at 222-29 (highlighting risks to public safety, national security, and personal privacy).

395.

See id at 227.

396.

See id at 187 (many large American drone developers have moved their operations abroad).

397.
398.

Id. at 191.
See id.

400.

See id at 193-94.

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

See id at 224.
Id at 230.
Id
Id at 232.
See id at 231-32.
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399. Id ("In simple English, that means that drones cannot fly past their pilot's visual line of view,
at all
is usually not more than a few hundred yards. Alternatively, an observer must visually observe the drone
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similar
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of sight by
(FPV technology would otherwise allow the pilot to operate a drone miles beyond her visual line
utilizing a camera in the drone's cockpit to transmit a video image back to the operator's position.)")
operat401. See id. at 192 (explaining that the FAA cannot waive restrictions related to visual line of sight,
ing over crowds, and operating during daylight hours).
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words, the FAA is trying to address a problem that technology has already
solved.
The FAA's registration requirements also miss the mark. As a practical
matter, criminals and terrorists are unlikely to register their drones, and the FAA
lacks a robust enforcement mechanism to make them do so.4 07 Even worse, in an
attempt to deter and catch those few bad actors who would use drone technology
to violate the privacy of others, the FAA has created a substitute risk with respect
to lawful drone operators. 408 "[I]nformation provided through drone registration
will be public, which means names and home addresses of drone pilots-as
young as thirteen years old-are public information."4 09 In short, the FAA has
exposed lawful operators to the very risk they seek to mitigate with their regulations.

So, why do these ineffective, outmoded regulatory measures persist? The
answer is "based [i]n systemic risk-misperception, exaggerating fear over reality."41 0 According to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, an attitude of zero-tolerance for risk has taken ahold of FAA regulators. 4 11
But, as Professor Sunstein has made clear, in a climate of substitute risks and
benefits, zero-tolerance is a fallacy.4 12 "It is evident that the FAA's focus concentrates far more on the risks of integrating drones into the national airspace
rather than on the benefits that drones provide (or, more importantly, the opportunity costs of not utilizing modern technology)."4 13 Put in more familiar terms,
by applying a strong Precautionary Principle to the risks posed by drone implementation, regulators have turned a blind eye towards the benefits and opportunities that have been lost as a result of their decisions.
The costs associated with not innovating in the field of drone technology
are massive.4 14 Drones have beneficial applications in a wide array of industries,
ranging from medicine to law enforcement and from conservation to tourism. 415
Unfortunately, FAA's archaic regulations impede many of these applications. 416
In response, major tech companies are moving their drone programs abroad. 41 7

Google has moved its drone delivery program to Australia. 18 Amazon has
moved similar programs to Canada and the United Kingdom. 4 19 "[T]his lost opportunity means that foreign nations-instead of America-are benefiting from
407.

408.
409.
410.

See id at 243-45.
Id at 244.
Id at 242-43.
Id at 233.

411. See NAT'L ACADS. SCI, ENGINEERING & MED., ASSESSING THE RISKS OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYS.
(UAS) INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 2 (2018).

412.
413.
414.
415.
rently has
416.
417.

418.
419.

See Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1028.
Calandrillo et al., supra note 383, at 212.
Id at 212-13.
See id. at 194-222 (highlighting just some of the applications and benefits of drone technology curto offer).
See id. at 238.
See id at 235.
Id
See id. at 236-37.
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But the costs exacted by technological risk misperception are not limited to
42
economic ones.422 There are direct human costs as well. Drone technology has
been used in other countries to "deliver emergency equipment and supplies to
24
and
the world's hard-to-reach areas."4 Drones have also been used by 4search
25
Consedisasters.
natural
rescue officials to save lives in remote areas or after
quently, thanks to drone technology, deaths that were once tragic are now tragiNo
cally preventable. "Simply put, the FAA's line-of-sight regulation costs lives.
26
traffic.'A
in
stuck
is
patient should die because their lifesaving treatment
Drone regulation in America "is a cautionary tale of how well-intended
laws and policies aimed at enhancing safety can silently cost lives rather than
protect them."4 27 It is also a tale of how our brains contribute to systemic risk
misperception by amplifying some risks far above reward. Drone regulation underscores the importance of combatting systemic technological risk misperception as well as the tired and fallacious regulatory attitude of better safe than sorry.
B.

The Costs of FearingAutonomous Vehicles

While the previous example largely focused on regulators, the example of
autonomous vehicles largely turns on public perceptions of risk, thus highlighting the duality of risk misperception in America. Every three years, as many
Americans are killed on the roads "as were killed in all of the country's wars
since World War I."428 Consequently, over the course of one's life, driving rep-9
resents a significant source of risk. Yet Americans do not to treat it that way4'
Rarely do we stop to consider whether it might be our last day on earth when we
start our engines as a police officer might when she starts her day-even though
430
Some fear flying over driving even though the
the risk of death is comparable.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id at 235 (emphasis added).
Id at 237.
See id. at 210.
See id at 211-12.

424.
425.

Id (explaining that drones have been used to deliver blood transfusions and laboratory samples).
See id at 210-11 (describing how drones have been used to locate and recover hundreds of victims).

426.
427.

Id at 212.
Id. at 185.

428. Haberman, supra note 322.
("De429. See viscusi, Valuing Risk ofDeathfrom Terrorismand NaturalDisasters,supra note 8, at 211
as are
spite the highly focused nature of past terrorism-related fatalities, terrorism deaths are valued as highly
fatalities associated with motor-vehicle accidents, which are much more diffusely distributed").
430. There are around 800,000 sworn law enforcement officers in the United States. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUST., NCJ 249681, NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA (2016),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM73-7SVR]; Law Enforcement Facts, NAT'L
LAW ENFORCEMENT MEM'L FUND, https://nleomf.org/facts-figures/law-enforcement-facts [https://perma.cc/NC

C9-7Y2F] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022). In 2019, eighty-nine officers were killed in the line of duty (almost half of
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latter is far more dangerous. 43 1 In short, many Americans downplay the risks
associated with driving and underestimate the imperative for a revolution in
safety technology. Deaths and injuries on the highways are seen as tragic and
unfortunate by the public when they should be viewed as completely preventable.
This systemic risk misperception has stalled implementation of the one technology that offers an all-encompassing solution: automation. 432
The human toll associated with maintaining the status quo and failing to
develop and implement self-driving cars is staggering.4 33 According to the
NHTSA, 36,560 people were killed in traffic crashes in 2018 alone. 434 The CDC
estimates 2 million more are injured each year. 435 The economic costs are also
sobering. 436 "[F]or crashes that occurred in 2017, the cost of medical care and
productivity losses associated with occupant injuries and deaths from motor vehicle traffic crashes exceeded $75 billion."4 37 Human error is responsible for
around ninety percent of all automobile crashes. 438 In other words, drivers as a
class represent one of the most dangerous groups in America. Understandably,
proponents of self-driving cars seek to remove human error from the equation,
much like airplane manufacturers have done with great success. 439
Knowing the high price Americans pay on the roadways each year, one
would expect the public to embrace and support any technology that promises to
reduce that burden. Sadly, however, motorists have often required convincing
before adopting new safety technology.44 0 In the context of automated cars, a
major roadblock developers face is convincing motorists to hand the keys over
to a computer.441 In one survey of perceived opportunity cost, researchers found
those deaths were themselves driving related), meaning about one in every 9000 officers are killed in the line of
duty each year. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Releases 2019 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of Duty (May 4, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-

releases-2019-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty

[https://perma.cc/WS3C-X5ES].

&

The U.S. population is around 328.2 million. Quick Facts, U.S. CENsus BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219 (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/KB7R-BUB7]. Assuming all Americans are members of the risk population, the risk of motor vehicle death each year is also around one in 9000.
See Odds of Dying, NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/all-injuries/preventable-death-overview/odds-of-dying/data-details/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/DN44-GEK7].
431. See Blalock et al., supra note 9, at 1717.
432. See, e.g., Raue et al., supra note 263, at 2.
433. Traffic Deaths Decreased in 2018, but Still 36,560 People Died, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/traffic-deaths-2018 (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/T8DS-GP5K].
434. Id.
435. Motor Vehicle Crash Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/motor-vehicle-safety/index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/S39G-4JYS].
436. Costs Data and Prevention Policies, Motor Vehicle Safety, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/costs/index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://
perma.cc/7JR4-66FC].

437.

Id.

438. See Haberman, supra note 322; see also Raue et al., supra note 263 (estimating it at 94%).
439. See, e.g., Raue et al., supra note 263, at 2.
440. See Haberman, supra note 322.
441. See id.; see also Jingya Gao, Andisheh Ranjbari & Don MacKenzie, Would Being Driven by Others
Affect the Value of Travel Time? Ridehailing as an Analogy for Automated Vehicles, 46 TRANSP. 2103, 2104
(2019) ("[T]he overall sustainability effects of ridehailing and vehicle automation will depend strongly on
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that individuals valued time spent in a self-driving Uber as more costly than an
442
This
identical normal Uber and even more costly than driving themselves.
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sent." 44 3
Heuristics and cognitive biases that drive technological risk misperception
offer a partial yet substantial explanation for why consumers need convincing.
One study of public perceptions of self-driving technology concluded that the
"change in status quo-from an active driver to a passive driver-may be perceived as a loss among those who value the feeling of control when driving."444
Reports of individuals sleeping behind the wheel of their Teslas are "disturbing"
and "unsettling" precisely because they represent a departure from the familiar
status quo to the unfamiliar.44 5 It is worth noting that, despite the salience of
these reports, fatalities since Tesla released its autopilot product in 2014 have
been exceedingly rare. 44 6 The fear of losing control also helps "explain higher
7
risk and lower benefit perception of self-driving cars."44 The study concluded
that "[g]iving up control may, in fact, be one of the major barriers to the adoption
of self-driving cars."" 8
9
Unfamiliarity, it seems, is also accompanied by ignorance.44 The same
study found "evidence that ... [p]eople who had greater experience with vehicle
automation technologies had lower risk and higher benefit perceptions as well as

travelers' behavioral responses to the technology, particularly how it affects their perceived value of in-vehicle
time."); see also Darrell M. west, Brookings Survey Finds Only 21 Percent Willing to Ride in a Self-Driving
Car, BROOKINGS (July 23, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/07/23/brookings-survey-findsonly-21-percent-willing-to-ride-in-a-self-driving-car/ [https-/perma.cc/8BQY-LQK3] ("When asked in a survey
undertaken by researchers at the Brookings Institution how likely they are to ride in a self-driving car, only 21
percent of adult internet users said they are inclined to do so ... ").
442. See Gao et al., supra note 441, at 2114.

443.

Id. at 2103.

444.

Raue, supra note 263, at 368.

445.

See, e.g., Christopher Brito, Disturbing Video Shows DriverApparently Asleep in Moving Tesla on

Highway, CBS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2019, 7:27 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tesla-driver-asleep-at-the[https://perma.cc/6HE7wheel-disturbing-video-shows-driver-apparently-asleep-in-moving-testa-on-highway/

93W9]; Aaron Holmes, Watch These Unsettling Videos of All the Times Tesla Autopilot Drivers were Caught
Asleep at the Wheel in 2019, INSIDER (Dec. 2,2019, 11:48 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/drivers-sleep[https://perma.cc/MMY8-9DJ4]; Peter C.
ing-in-tesla-cars-autopilot-asleep-while-driving-videos-2019-12
Baker, 'I Think This Guy Is, Like, Passedout in His Tesla,' N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.ny-

times.com/2019/11/27/magazine/tesla-autopilot-sleeping.html

[https://perma.cc/E9QP-LTNV]. One German

court went so far as to ban Testa's use of the word autonomous because it felt that word amounted to false
advertisement See Jack Ewing, German CourtSays Tesla Self-Driving Claims Are Misleading, N.Y. TsMES (July

14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/business/tesla-autopilot-germany.html
2ARK-NRAJ].

[https://perma.cc/

446. Only 10 individuals have died as a direct result of Tesla's autopilot function. See TESLA DEATHS,
https://www.tesladeaths.com/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9SPF-FSKA] (tracking global deaths
related to Testa vehicles and explaining its tracking decisions); see also Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (May

14, 2018), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/996131586469842945 [https://perma.cc/FRN5-3DYN] ("It's super messed up that a Tesla crash resulting in a broken ankle is front page news and the ~ 40,000 people who died
in US auto accidents alone in past year get almost no coverage.").
447. Raue et al., supra note 263, at 368.

448.

Id. at 369.

449.

Id. at 368.
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higher trust ratings of self-driving cars .. . ."450 Without this experience and
knowledge, individuals rely on their heuristics to fill the decisional void, which
typically disfavor emerging technologies. 451 In addition to lack of information
there is an issue of disinformation. The publication of rare but retainable negative
media hype means that the availability heuristic reinforces already inflated perceptions of risk. Those who had heard stories of accidents involving self-driving
cars-such as the tragic and highly-publicized death of a Tempe woman-"reported lower trust levels in self-driving cars."45 2 A single negative story has the
power to implant a seed of doubt in the public and derail years of progress. 453
Self-driving cars represent a paradigm of technological risk misperception.
Factors inherent in the technology itself and inherent in human behavior operate
to inflate risks and obscure benefits. 454 While many American drivers are unsure
about whether they can ever trust a self-driving car with their family's safety, if
they understood their existing vehicle to be the ticking time bomb it represents,
they might begin to wonder if they can afford not to.
C.

What's Next? The Costs of FearingArtificial Intelligence

As explained in Section HI.E on losing control, American pop culture has
a macabre fascination with artificial intelligence-induced dystopias and doomsdays. 455 This is likely because it taps into the powerful human discomfort with
losing control. The two preceding examples of systemic technological risk misperception may be harbingers of what is in store for developers of Al. Ironically,
one of the most vocal proponents of automated vehicles, Tesla CEO Elon Musk,

450.

Id.

451. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1131.
452. Raue et al, supra note 263, at 368. Elaine Herzberg was struck and killed by a self-driving Uber after
she appeared suddenly from the side of the road in the dark. See Uber in Fatal Crash Had Safety Flaws Say US
Investigators, BBC (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50312340 [https://perma.cc/MCU9AY4V]. The human driver hired to watch over the automated system had taken her eyes off the road at the
moment of impact. Id Many experts, including the police felt that no human driver could have avoided the
collision. See Aarian Marshall, The Uber Crash Won't Be the Last Shocking Self-Driving Death, WIRED (Mar.
31, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/uber-self-driving-crash-explanation-lidar-sensors/ [https://
perma.cc/5ZWS-L5ZK]. However, the reason the vehicle did not register Ms. Herzberg was because it was not
programmed to account for the possibility of jaywalkers. See BBC, supra note 452. There are no innocent parties
in this incident. Ms. Herzberg should not have been Jaywalking. The human driver should not have been looking
at her phone. And Uber programmers should have taken jaywalking into account. But to use this example to
suggest that self-driving cars are untrustworthy or unsafe-as many publications have done-would irrationally
hold self-driving cars to a higher standard than their human counterparts. Interestingly, it turns out that the most
difficult part of designing and programming self-driving cars is trying to predict the irrational behavior of human
beings. See Neal E. Boudette, Despite High Hopes, Self-Driving Cars Are 'Way in the Future,'N.Y. TIMES (July

17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.con2019/07/17/business/self-driving-autonomous-cars.html

[https://perma.cc/

AT8X-BZWE]. This means that human irrationality threatens not only public acceptance of the technology, but

its feasibility as well.
453.
454.
455.

See Raue et al., supra note 263, at 369.
See id.
See supra Section III.E.
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456
He has largely been
is also one of the most vocal critics of Al technology.
457
dismissed by industry insiders as a fear-mongerer, alarmist, and doomsayer.
While his "relatively extreme views on Al are shared by a small minority of Al
researchers[, his] celebrity status means they're heard by huge audiences and this
frustrates people doing actual Al research.' 58
When it comes to Al, Elon Musk is a walking contradiction. On the one
hand, he believes that AI development represents possibly the greatest existential
threat to human existence. 4 59 On the other hand, "Musk's Al investments have
allowed him to stay close to the field he's so afraid of."A60 He is automating
vehicles, developing neural interfaces, 461 and has profited handsomely off of his
462
On the one hand, Musk
Al investments (albeit on the pretense of precaution).
computers. 63 On the
to
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will
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thinks there is a good chance
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is
his fear-mongering
exist.
gence does not already
Whether one understands Elon Musk as a symptom or source of public
fears, it is clear that the emerging field of AI technology is at great risk of falling
victim to systemic technological risk misperception. In a poll of Americans, fiftythree percent felt advancing the field was important, but the rest felt it was either
unnecessary or potentially dangerous. 465 Another survey found that "Americans,
on average, expect that high-level machine intelligence will have a harmful impact on balance. Overall, thirty-four percent think that the technology will have

456. See Sam Shead, Elon Musk has a Complex Relationship with the A.I Community, CNBC (May 13,
2020, 4:35 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/13/elon-musk-has-a-complex-relationship-with-the-ai-com-

munity.html [https://perma.cc/2Q26-4BRX].
457. Id.
458. Id. ("As one of the most famous tech figures in the world, Musk's alarmist views on Al can potentially
reach millions of people.").
459. See Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (Sept. 4, 2017), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/904633084309422080 [https://perma.cc/E5WX-U69Q]; Maureen Dowd, Elan Musk's Billion-Dollar Crusade to Stop the A.I Apocalypse, VANrTY FAIR (March 26, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/

03/elon-musk-billion-dollar-crusade-to-stop-ai-space-x

[https://perma.cc/2WT5-QXME].

460. Shead, supranote 456.
461. Anthony Cuthbertson, Elon Musk ClaimsHis Neuralink Chip WillAllow You to Stream MusicDirectly
to Your Brain, INDEPENDENT (July 21, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-

tech/news/elon-musk-neuralink-brain-computer-chip-music-stream-a9
3T5C].

6 2 76 6

8 .htm

[https://perma.cc/4SSW-

462. Gilbert, supra note 253 ("Musk was an early investor in DeepMind, which sold to Google in 2014 for
over $500 million, according to reports. He said in a 2017 interview that he made the move to keep an eye on
burgeoning AI developments, not for a return on investment.").
463. Jillian D'Onfro, Elon Musk Thinks We Need Brain-Computersto Avoid Becoming 'House Cats' to

Artificial Intelligence, INSIDER (June 1, 2016, 11:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-on-neural-lace-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/7H8J-4Y7R].
464. Jason Koebler, Elon Musk Says There's a 'One in Billions' Chance Reality Is Not a Simulation, vICE
(June 2, 2016), 7:10 AM), https://www.vice.com/enus/article/8q854v/elon-musk-simulated-universe-hypothe-

sis [https://perma.cc/ZW6Z-AMGK].
465. See 60 Minutes/Vanity FairPoll: Artificial Intelligence, 60 MINUTES (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-vanity-fair-poll-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/AD2G-2T9R] (describing that 4% of the Americans polled felt AI would anger God).
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a harmful impact; in particular, twelve percent said it could be extremely bad,
leading topossible human extinction.466 It seems many Americans are also somewhat uninformed about the wide array of applications and benefits Al technology
has to offer. Fifty-three percent said they would use an intelligent robot for dayto-day chores. 46 ' Freeing Americans from their menial tasks represents one of
the more inconsequential benefits of Al technology.

68

In response to fears-

some rational and some irrational-about the consequences of AI, many are calling for increased regulation of its development. 469 Congress 470 and the White
House 471 have expressed interest in responding to these fears. Whether the regulatory response reflects irrational fears, as with drones and self-driving cars, or
rational fears, only time will tell. Given AI's potential to completely revolutionize the human experience for the better, 472 the lost opportunities that could arise
from misperception of the associated risks should give pause to overzealous regulators.
The foregoing examples of systemic technological risk misperception

demonstrate the insidious nature of the consequences such misperception brings.
It is difficult to comprehend lost opportunities. Because the causes and consequences of systemic risk misperception are so difficult to comprehend, remedying those issues is equally challenging.
IV. PERCEIVING REALITY: HOW TO COMBAT SYSTEMIC TECHNOLOGICAL RISK
MISPERCEPTION

Any discussion about remedying systemic technological risk misperception
in American decision-making must account for the political realities of our system of government. Generally speaking, there are two overlapping levels of decision-making in American politics: (1) high-level government decision-making
conducted by politicians and regulators and (2) democratic decision-making conducted by individuals voting with their ballots, their feet, and their wallets. A
466.

BAOBAO ZHANG & ALLAN DAFOE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AMERICAN ATTITUDES AND TRENDS IN

CTR. FOR GOVERNANCE Al § 6.4 (2019), https://governanceai.
github.io/US-Public-Opinion-Report-Jan-2019/igh-level-machine-intelligence.html#subsecharmgood
[https://
perma.cc/5FS4-JXN7] (emphasis added).
467. See 60 Minutes/Vanity FairPoll: ArtificialIntelligence, supra note 465.
468. For an account of potential benefits and applications of AI technology, see, for example, Taarini K.
Dang, AI Transforming the World, FORBES (Feb 24, 2019, 8:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/02/24/ai-transforming-the-world/#30b80ed94fD3 [https://perma.cc/Y54W-VYXB]; Katherine Gammon, 5 Ways AI Will Change the World by 2050, USC TROJAN FAMILY (2017), https://news.usc.edu/trojan-family/five-ways-ai-will-change-the-world-by-2050/ [https://perma.cc/4SDP-JZBT]; Darrell M. West & John R.
Allen, How ArtificialIntelligence Is Transformingthe World, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/FZ5U-Y8Y3].
469. See Arjun Kharpal, Big Tech's Callsfor More Regulation Offers a Chancefor Them to Increase Their
Power, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/28/big-techs-calls-for-ai-regulation-could-lead-to-more-power.
HIGH-LEVEL MACHINE INTELLIGENCE,

html (Jan. 28, 2020, 1:21 AM), [https://perma.cc/7UQ4-KY7B].
470.

See generallyRegulation of Artificial Intelligence, LIBR. CONG. (Jan. 2019), https://tile.loc.gov/stor-

age-services/service/l/llglrd/2019668143/2019668143.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LA7-AEKD] ("In the 115th Congress, thirty-nine bills have been introduced that have the phrase "artificial intelligence" in the text of the bill.").

Order No. 13859,

471.

See Exec.

472.

West & Allen, supra note 468.

84 Fed. Reg. 3967, (Feb. 11, 2019).

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

650

[Vol. 2022

remedial scheme aimed at combatting systemic risk misperception must address
both levels of decision-making in order to create meaningful change. Systematic
problems require systemic solutions.
A problem with multiple sources, such as systemic technological risk misperception, has multiple solutions. We do not profess to possess a magic elixir to
cure human beings of our biases. However, we pause here to offer suggestions,
insights, and areas for further research that could assist in insulating decisionmaking processes from the effects of systemic technological risk misperception.
A.
1.

Addressing Risk Misperception in Government Decisionmakers

Reversing the War on Agency Expertise

Expertise and objectivity should drive decision-making, particularly in the
context of complex emerging technologies. The decision to adopt, delay, or regulate an emerging technology often involves dense informational processing, risk
weighing, and deliberations that the average legislator, let alone the average
voter, simply cannot perform.4 73 The existence of the administrative state-particularly independent agencies-is a recognition that a directly democratic process of decision-making is not always the most efficient, nor even the most desired, process when facing complex issues. Some believe, however, that the
administrative state's tenuous relationship with democracy is untenable and,
worse, unconstitutional. 474 They have made great strides towards injecting popular control into the administrative state at the expense of agency expertise and
independence.4 75 To the contrary, however, the purpose of agency expertise is
4 6
n a reprenot to supplant democratic decision-making but to supplement it.
decisiondemocratic
to
inform
sentative democracy, expertise must be allowed
477
this Arin
highlighted
at
large
Given the natural biases of the polity
making.
could
decisionmakers
agency
from
ticle, the trend of stripping discretion away
have disastrous effects for emerging technology.
As Professor Sunstein has explained, "[i]f government follows the judgments of ordinary people, it will be risk averse in" the same way the people
are. 478 Decisionmakers "following popular views," will incorporate the systemic
479
"The result will be
biases of their constituents into their decisional processes.
473. William D. Eggers, Mike Turley & Pankaj Kamleshkumar Kishnani, The Future of Regulation: Principles for Regulating Emerging Technologies, DELOrrrE (June 19, 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/future-of-regulation/regulating-emerging-technology.html

[https://perma.cc/UCQ7-SPZK].
474.

See, e.g., PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL7 1 (2014).

475.

See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (stripping the

Public Corporation Accounting Oversight Board of double-for cause removal protections); Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (stripping the CFPB's chief of for-cause removal protection).
476. See Peter L. Strauss, How the Administrative State Got to This Challenging Place, 150 DAEDALUS 17,

17, 24 (2021).
477. See id.
478. Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1020.
479. Id.
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to move regulation in the direction suggested by the [strong] precautionary principle."480 This is not to say that the judgments of ordinary people are irrelevant
or should be discounted. Quite the opposite, expertise should inform the judgments of ordinary people and the judgments of ordinary people should inform
the experts. 48 1 A sensible balance must be struck.
Recent developments in administrative law and American politics threaten
that balance.4 82 The Supreme Court has attempted to increase democratic accountability in the administrative state by bolstering executive oversight at the
expense of expertise and independence. In FreeEnterpriseFund v. Public Company Oversight Board, the Court held that Congress could not provide members
of a Securities and Exchange ("SEC") board with for-cause removal protections
because the SEC itself already had such protections. 483 In other words, the Constitution can tolerate one layer of protection from executive interference with
multi-member commissions, but not two. In Seila Law v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, the Court held that Congress' choice to provide the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's ("CFPB") sole director with the same removal protections was unconstitutional.4 84 Instead, the Court held that the
CFPB's chief had to be removable at will by the President. 485 Lastly, In November of 2020, Justice Alito gave a highly controversial speech to the Federalist
Society in which he questioned the wisdom of decision-making by experts. 486
While these examples represent the most direct challenges to agency independence, they are part of a silent, creeping trend that would reduce the impact of
agency experts on policymaking, 487 and increase the influence of layman politicians. 4 88
480. Id.
See Michael Schudson, The Trouble with Experts-and Why Democracies Need Them, 35 THEORY

&

481.

Soc'Y 491, 492 (2006).
482. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010); Seila L. LLC
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).
483. See 561 U.S. at 492 ("We hold that the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board members
contravene the Constitution's separation of powers.").

484.

See 140 S. Ct. at 2197 ("We hold that the CFPB's leadership by a single individual removable only for

inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers.").
485. See id. at 2192 ("The agency may therefore continue to operate, but its Director, in light of our decision,
must be removable by the President at will.").
486. See The Federalist Society, Address by Justice Samuel Alito [2020 National Lawyers Convention],
YoUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VMnukCVIZWQ [https://perma.c/4TTG-

KGNR].
487. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (attempting
to resurrect the nondelegation doctrine); Kisor v. Wilke, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019) (placing Auer deference
on its deathbed potentially); Oil States Energy Servs., v. Greene's Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377 (2018)
(holding the patent and trademark office could adjudicate inter partes review without violating Article I1I, but
taking a narrow, originalist approach to non-Article III adjudication).
488. Interestingly, while opponents of the administrative state never fail to point out that the Framers and
the ratifying generation had no conception of post-New Deal agencies, these opponents do fail to point out that
the Framers expected a level of expertise to exist amongst politicians. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Confronting
the Administrative State, NAT'L AFFAIRS (Fall 2015), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/confronting-the-administrative-state [https://perma.cc/RKQ5-F8SW]. In his seminal book, Professor Akhil Amar
explains how the entire structure of Article I, indeed the entire system ofrepresentative democracy, was designed
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While we offer no opinion as to whether the robust executive oversight the
Court envisions for the administrative state is constitutionally mandated, we do
think that the simultaneous rise in populism should give the Supreme Court pause
when considering arguments of public policy. With the rise of populism,
"knowledge of every kind is also under attack. Parents argue with their child's
doctor over the safety of vaccines. Famous athletes speculate that the world
might actually be flat... ."489 Some politicians "portray experts as untrustworthy
490
As a
and contemptuous elites out to subvert the will of ordinary Americans."
result, "[a] significant number of laypeople now believe, for no reason but self49
affirmation, that they know better than experts in almost every field." 1 Even
during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the, voice of experts, like Dr. Anthony
Fauci, should have been paramount, this war on expertise persisted-at the high492
est levels of government no less.
For agencies to serve their "expertise" function, they cannot be constantly
looking over their shoulders to the White House, wondering what it will think of
their policy decisions. Moreover, if the Court continues down this path and a
populist, or worse, a demagogue, occupies the Oval Office, civil servants will
have no means of insulating their decision-making processes from the biases and
493
The biases
misperceptions she will inevitably bring to bear on the regulators.
now
is
needed
expertise
that
demonstrate
Article
this
and heuristics identified in

to promote an expert class of legislators. AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 66-79 (2005).
"Madison and other Federalists did indeed envision a House [and Senate] composed of enlightened lawmakers
with extensive geographic reputations and the ability to riseabove ill-informedpopularprejudiceswhen the need
arose. Such enlightened statesmen would give the new republic more stability and wisdom in its dealings with
foreign nations, and would add needed gravitas to domestic politics as well.". Id at 79 (emphasis added). After
the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, this underlying assumption of the Framers no longer holds to the
same extent. See id. at 412-15. Consider, for example, the election of Senator Tommy Tuberville-whose only
qualifications for office seem to be that he is a former SEC football coach, he is unaware what the three branches
of government are, and is unclear as to which ideology America fought to eradicate in WWII. See Catie Edmondson, Senator-electTommy Tuberville Flubs Basics of the Constitution, World War II and the 2000 Election, N.Y.

TIMEs (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/us/tommy-tuberville-fact-check.html [perma.
cc/XV89-HJRM].
489. Tom Nichols, How We Killed Expertise, POLITICO (August/October 2017), https://www.polit2 553

1 [https://perma.cc/9GJK-TXL5].
ico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/how-we-killed-expertise- 1
21, 2019),
490. Ronald Brownstein, Trump's War on Expertise Is Only Intensifying, ATLANTIC (Nov.
2383
/ [https://
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/trump-attack-vindman-yovanovitch-hill/60

perma.cc/3L58-T2UN].
491. Nichols, supra note 489.
492. See Scott Lehigh, Time to End Populism's War on Expertise, BOs. GLOBE (Apr. 7, 2020, 9:55 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/04/07/opinion/time-end-populisms-war-expertise/ [https://perma.cc/6KKAT8CL]; Mia Jankowicz, Trump Attacked Fauci'sAdvice and Boasted of Ignoring Government Experts in His
Coronavirus Response, INSIDER (July 9, 2020,5:08 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-attacks-fauciboasts-of-ignoring-experts-on-coronavirus-2020-7 [https://perma.cc/3PWM-95BM]; Syon Bhanot, Why Are
People Ignoring Expert Warnings?-PsychologicalReactance, BEHAV. SCI. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://behavioralscientist.org/why-are-people-ignoring-expert-wamings-psychological-reactance-coronavims-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/47NU-432K]; see also Tamar Lapin, Anthony FauciSays Family Needs Security over Death
Threats, Continuing Harassment, N.Y. POST (Aug. 5, 2020, 11:13 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/08/05/faucisays-he-and-his-daughters-need-security-over-death-threats/ [https://perma.cc/44Sw-PCC5] (detailing death
threats towards the Nation's leading expert on the COVID-19 pandemic and his family).
493.

Nichols, supra note 489.
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more than ever to accurately assess the risks associated with emerging technology.
2.

MandatingMarginal Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk-Risk Analysis

By requiring regulators to employ marginal cost-benefit analysis and riskrisk analysis, we can minimize the influence of systemic technological risk misperception and ensure that substitution costs are not ignored in the decision-making process. Federal courts are grappling with the question of "whether agencies
are required to engage in some form of cost-benefit analysis."4 94 Congress is not
always clear what is required of an agency when it issues a mandate.4 5 For their
part, Presidents have issued guidance urging agencies to deploy some form of
cost-benefit analysis. 496 While this push to require cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decision-making is a necessary step in combatting systemic technological
risk misperception, it is woefully inadequate on its own.
Agencies must engage in the additional step of assessing marginal costs
and benefits in addition to simple overall cost-benefit decision-making. Marginal
decision-making "ask[s] not merely whether the benefits created by a given program exceed the costs imposed, but rather, whether the regulation maximizes the
benefits minus the costs." 498 This analysis, which seeks to get the most regulatory
bang per buck, can address what Justice Stephen Breyer once dubbed "The Last
10 Percent."4 99 "At hazardous waste sites, for example, Breyer states that 90%
or more of agency resources are spent to clean up the last 10% of the risk posed,
whereas it takes only the first 10% of those resources to eliminate 90% of the
total risk."5 00 Generally speaking, the point where regulation should cease is
where marginal costs equal marginal benefits. 50 1 If regulators go further than
that, "for every additional dollar spent, society gets less than a dollar back in
benefits." 502 At this point, where marginal returns are negative, regulators should
consider whether their time and money might have a larger impact somewhere
else.

494. See Sunstein, supra note 257, at 2.
495. See id at 3.
496. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) ("In deciding whether and how to regulate,
agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not
regulating. Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures ... and qualitative
measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider. Further, in
choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net
benefits . .. , unless a statute requires another regulatory approach."); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed.
Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (building upon Executive Order 12866).
497. See Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENv'T L. REV. 1, 6
(2017).
498. Calandrillo, supra note 8, at 991.
499. Id. (quoting STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 11-12 (Harvard U. Press 1993)).
500.
Id. (citing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE vICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
11-12 (Harvard U. Press 1993)).
501. See id. at 994.
502. Id. at 994.
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In the context of emerging technology regulation, marginal cost-benefit
analysis would prevent government from prohibitively regulating emerging technology. At some point regulators must ask: "Is it worth it to continue trying to
improve the safety of this [promising technology] given the fact that we already
have 99% of the risk eliminated ... ?"'03 By requiring agencies to consider
whether more restrictive, costly regulation of emerging technology would yield
an equal or higher benefit to society, we can ensure that the scope of regulation
is optimal. It would allow agencies to ratchet up regulation to the point where
public safety is maximized in proportion to cost while ensuring that technology
developers are free to innovate at a reasonable and responsible pace.
In addition to marginal cost-benefit analysis, mandating risk-versus-risk
analysis in agency decision-making would also reduce the influence of systemic
technological risk misperception on decision-making. Risk-risk analysis would
require agency decisionmakers to consider the substitution risks that a given restriction on technology would create as well as the lost benefits and opportunities
that would result.504 In other words, regulators would be required to consider all
the costs, not just the readily available ones. It is the simple, but overlooked,
proposition that "[a]ll regulations should reduce current risks by a greater amount
505
As this Article
than the additional [unintended] risks they impose on society."
has repeatedly indicated, when it comes to regulating emerging technologies,
substitution costs and lost opportunities are the rule-not the exception. When
regulating in this field, risk-risk analysis would require regulators to consider the
unintended risks and lost benefits that would occur when choosing to maintain
the status quo over implementing a new piece of technology.
Whether it comes from congressional mandate, executive order, or judicial
interpretation, agencies should be required to engage in both marginal cost-benefit analysis and risk-risk analysis. In addition to increasing efficiency and reducing arbitrariness across the administrative state, these important changes
would provide the benefit of minimizing the impact of systemic technological
risk misperception on agency decision-making.
3.

Structural Changes to Agencies

Of course, merely directing agencies to engage in better cost-benefit analyses is not enough. A risk oversight function should exist somewhere in the administrative state to ensure that agencies are educated about complying with the
aforementioned mandates. Generally speaking, agency oversight can be centralized, decentralized, or a combination thereof. Centralized review of agency action primarily occurs in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs

503.

Id. at 991 (internal quotations removed).

504. See id. at 996-98 (discussing risk-risk analysis).
505. Id. at 998.
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("OIRA"), 506 a division of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), 507
itself contained within the Executive Office of the President. Decentralized oversight comes in the form of officers housed within the different agencies that have
oversight mandates. 50 8 For example, the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018 established, among other offices, a Chief Data Officer for
every agency tasked with managing burgeoning government data.509 The two
forms of oversight, however, are not mutually exclusive.5 1 0 For example, the decentralized Chief Data Officer also serves as "agency liaison" to the centralized
OMB. 51 1
We propose the creation of a decentralized and centralized system to oversee agency risk analysis in order to combat misperception in decision-making.
Congress could either establish a Chief Risk Officer in every relevant agency or
expand the responsibilities of a preexisting officer, perhaps the Chief Information Officer or Chief Technology Officer. This officer would be tasked with
educating agency officials on systemic technological risk misperception and
identifying its manifestations in their respective agency's actions. This officer
would also ensure agency decisionmakers have conducted the proper marginal
cost-benefit analysis and risk-risk analysis.
In conjunction with the creation of Chief Risk Officers, Congress could
create a risk-taking agency or form a body within OIRA to liaise with the Chief
Risk Officers. Just as OIRA already reviews significant regulatory actions for
proper cost-benefit analysis,5 1 2 this specialized risk review body would be tasked
with ensuring that agencies have considered substitution risks, marginal costs,
and lost opportunities in their decision to restrict an emerging technology.
While these structural changes to agency review should only come after
thorough debate and deliberation, we believe they would be an important step in
the right direction to minimize the effects of systemic technological risk misperception.
4.

Fight Firewith Fire:How Tech Can Help Regulate Itself

As demonstrated in the case of drone regulation, technology can sometimes
be the answer to its own problems.51 3 In addition to saving lives and improving
506. See Information and Regulatory Affairs, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/SS6D-XSP9].
507. See Office ofManagement and Budget, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ (last visited

Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/WYN3-QFAU].
508. See e.g., Pub. L. No. 94-505, 90 Stat 2429 (1976) (establishing one of the earliest office of inspector
general in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare).
509. Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-435, § 3520, 132 Stat.

5529, 5541-42 (2019).
510.

See, e.g., id (describing decentralized Chief Data Officer).

511.

Id

512. Modernizing Regulatory Review, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/modernizing-regulatory-review/ [https://perma.cc/23PZ-YDZ7].
513. See Calandrillo et al., supra note 383, at 187 ("This Article highlights the shortcomings of the FAA's
regulatory scheme, and proposes to fight fire with fire by using technology to solve technology's own prob-

lems.").
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standards of living, emerging technology also offers the opportunity to improve
regulatory decision-making by reducing or eliminating human error in risk assessment.
For example, researchers from China have already pieced together a theoretical framework for how artificial intelligence will revolutionize risk analysis.5 14 The researchers explain that "[t]he traditional method of perceptual evaluation mainly relies on senior experts in related fields, and . .. the accumulation
of years of experience in a certain field. ... "515 Through time, humans have also
developed statistical modeling and computer simulation to assist in assessing
risk.516 This form of risk analysis, however, is labor- and resource-intensive and
is still highly dependent on human assumptions and analysis, and thus, highly
influenced by human bias.5 1 7 "With the rapid development of computing science,
new technologies such as big data and artificial intelligence have brought new
ways for risk assessment . .. that is, scientific research in the era of big data will
5 18
Removing human error from risk
no longer require models and assumptions."
making' in the future ....
decision
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514. See Shuya Bai, Danhui Feng & Oingfeng Dang, Research and Application of Artificial Intelligence
Technology in the Fieldof Risk Perception,J. PHYSICS 1, 1 (2019).
515. Id. at 3.
516. See id.
517. See id.
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519. Id. at 5.
520. See Mallory Simon and Rachel Clarke, America's InfrastructureIs Crumbling and These People Are
Suffering Because of It, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/17/us/cruwhbling-american-infrastructure/index.

html (June 21, 2019, 9:01 PM), [https://perma.cc/U3EA-Y5JZ].
521. Alexander Guzman, Choie Eugene, Shuichi Ishida & Atsushi Aoyama, Artificial IntelligenceImproving Safety and Risk Analysis: A ComparativeAnalysisfor CriticalInfrastructure,2016 IEEE IN T'L CONE. INDUS.
ENG'G & ENG'G MGMT. (IEEM) 471, 471 (2016).
522. Id. at 475.
523. See generally Seth Guikema, ArtificialIntelligenceforNaturalHazardRisk Analysis: Potential,Challenges, and Research Needs, 40 RISK ANALYSIs 1117 (2020).
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Addressing Human Beings' Systemic Risk Misperception

Education

Education offers several avenues of combatting systemic technological risk
misperception. First, research has shown that simply educating individuals about
their biases and heuristics can go a long way in reducing misperceptions. 524 Put
differently, the first step in solving any problem is recognizing that there is one.
Second, developers, regulators, and manufacturers can begin educating the public about the risks associated with avoiding a new piece of technology.5 25 Third,
we can begin educating the next generation to process risk by removing them
from risk-free environments and placing them in controlled-risk environments.
As it turns out, the school of hard knocks might be the best place to learn accurate
risk assessment.526 While these three recommendations are certainly not exhaustive, they would go a long way towards reducing systemic risk misperception of
emerging technology.
The more we know about our biases and heuristics, the better we can identify when we are erroneously relying on them and correct our misperceptions. 527
Mindfulness and awareness provide us with a means of "resisting the satisfying
and simple answers and predictions that come with [cognitive biases] and engaging in the more unsettling process of doubting our categories and scripts and
looking for the harder-to-see effects of context and situation."528 These are
"some of the better ways to reduce the biases that result from our automatic cognitive processes." 529 Taking this research to heart, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington "proposed jury instructions ...

intended to alert the jury to the concept of unconscious bias and then to instruct
the jury in a straightforward way not to use bias ... in its evaluation .. . and in
its decision-making." 530 The court also produced an unconscious bias juror video

524. See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The GreatAttributionalDivide: How Divergent Views ofHuman
BehaviorAre ShapingLegal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 314, 334-36 (2008) (citing ELLEN J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS
61-79 (1989)).
525. See Sunstein, supra note 225, at 1034 ("The ... problem is that risks that are now in the realm of
uncertainty will often move, over time, into the realm of risk. Indeed, one of the principal goals of a well-functioning system of environmental protection is to acquire more information about potential hazards-information
that includes an understanding of the probability of harm. In some circumstances, acquiring information is far
better than responding to the worst-case scenario, at least when that response itself creates dangers in the realm
of both uncertainty and risk.").
526. vox, Why Safe PlaygroundsAren't Greatfor Kids, YOuTuBE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=lztEnBFN5zU [https://perma.cc/KZ33-BMZU].
527. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 524, at 334-36. See generally HANS ROSLING WrrH OLA ROSLING
& ANNA ROSLING RONNLUND, FACTFULNESS: TEN REASONS WE'RE WRONG ABOUT THE WORLD-AND WHY
THINGS ARE BETTER THAN YOU THINK (2018).

528. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 524, at 335.
529. Id.
530. Criminal Jury Instructions-Unconscious Bias, U.S. DIST. CT. W. DIST. WASH., https://www.
wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd/files/CriminalJurynstructions-ImplicitBias.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/W9LP-MNWD].

[Vol. 2022

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

658

531
While mindfulness and awareness
that is "presented to jurors in every case."
may seem overly simplistic, they should not be overlooked, particularly so in the
context of emerging technology. If consumers are made more aware of their unconscious biases, they may be able to make better decisions about new technology.
After educating the public and consumers on how to process risk information in an unbiased manner, we should affirmatively provide them with that
information. 532 In the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis, many faulted predatory lending practices as precipitating the subprime mortgage crisis."' Others
have argued that consumers should bear some of the blame because they made
poor decisions and irresponsibly took advantage of risk-laden lending practices. 534 Whatever narrative one accepts, Congress was clearly concerned with
the costs imposed by uninformed consumers and risk misperception when it es53 5
tablished the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. One of the CFPB's primary mandates from Congress is to "arm people with the information, steps, and
536
The application to
tools that they need to make smart financial decisions."
systemic technological risk misperception is clear. In order to make smart decisions about emerging technology, the public and consumers must be equipped
with accurate, unbiased information. Moreover, when one considers the fact that
emerging technology as an industry is susceptible to information manipulation,
access to information on associated risks is paramount. Whether it comes from
government agencies, developers, or manufacturers, everyone has an interest in
information.
Finally, while the desire to raise and educate our children in risk-free environments is understandable, this overprotectiveness can actually (ironically) op53 7
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erate as a disability for them later in life.
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533. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REP., 389-90 (2011) (repeatedly citing predatory lending as a root source of toxic mortgages).
534. See id. at 447 (disagreeing with the commission's stance on predatory lending practices. "[I]t also
appears that many people who received high risk loans were predatory borrowers, or engaged in mortgage fraud,
because they took advantage of low mortgage underwriting standards to benefit from mortgages they knew they
could not pay unless rising housing prices enabled them to sell or refinance.").
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playgrounds, reintroduces limited risk into child play areas.5 39 Measures include:
"erecting handmade play equipment like 20-ft. climbing towers; leaving intact
gorse bushes that are quite spiky; supervising children in the use of knives, saws,
and other tools; and building fires right in the play area."540 While such structures
and tools may seem shockingly dangerous to the modem American, one recent
study found an adventure playground to be statistically safer than the traditional
one over the course of five years. 54 1 This might be because the adventure playground attempts to channel a child's risky play instead of trying to eliminate it.
Furthermore, there is a method to this madness-namely, that "risk helps children develop essential life skills. Risky activities give kids a chance to develop
confidence and competence as they master challenges." 542 Rather than eliminate
all forms of risk from their lives, we should offer children controlled-risk environments so that they can learn to process and assess risk more accurately for
themselves. It could allow them to be better citizens and more responsible decisionmakers, particularly vis-A-vis emerging technologies.
2.

Engineeringand Design

Engineers and designers in the field of emerging technology can, and
should, develop technology with our cognitive biases and heuristics in mind.
Specifically, developers can make technology more palatable by providing users
with illusions of control and a false sense of familiarity. 543 As explained in Part
III, lack of familiarity and the feeling of losing control are main drivers of systemic technological risk over-perception. But as we also saw, the brain can be
tricked into experiencing feelings of familiarity and control. 544 Exploiting this
observation could greatly reduce users' aversions to technology.
In the field of user experience ("UX") design, experts have been concerned
with illusions of control since the early days of personal computing. 545 "The most
common solution is the loading screen. It keeps us waiting, but at least we understand what's going on-loading is in progress." 546 While we may not have
control over the process of loading, the status bar does provide us with some
539.

Amanda R.
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& James F. Palmer, Skrammellegepladsen: Denmark's First Adventure Play

Area, PROCEEDINGS 2002 NE. RECREATION RscH. SYMP., 79, 80-81 (2002) (explaining that risk is partially controlled by an adult play leader who "does not interfere with the children's play but offers guidance and assurance.
They also provide a shield from interference by other adults .... "); see also Walker, supra note 537.
540. Barbara J. King, Is It Time to Bring Risk Back into Our Kids' Playgrounds?, NPR (Mar. 15, 2018,
3:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/I3.7/2018/03/15/594017146/is-it-time-to-bring-risk-back-into-our-kids
-playgrounds [https://perma.cc/9PDA-GL4X].
541. Morgan Leichter-Saxby & Jill Wood, Comparing Injury Rates on a Fixed Equipment Playground and
an Adventure Playground 1 (2018), https://popupadventureplaygrounds.files.wordpress.com/2018/02/parishjust-the-facts-final.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/J5ZZ-LFPL].
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reassurance.547 Other examples include placebo buttons, which do nothing except provide feelings of control (such as the refresh button on your email interface); incoherent controlled processes, which give us something to keep us occupied while we wait; and redundant actions such as a "cancel" button and an
"X" button on a browser window (both buttons do the same thing yet evoke dif548
ferent feelings when used). As technology continues to increase in complexity, UX designers will need to invest more into developing illusions of control if
they want the public to accept new technology.
Developers can also design familiarity into emergin technology. A prime
54
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example includes the dials and gauges in motor vehicles.
gauges with LCD
and
dials
manufacturers have slowly replaced mechanical
550
have
manufacturers
many
However, in designing the LCD interface,
screens.
55 1
into
design
familiar
a
By repackaging
mimicked the mechanical predecessors.
two
the
between
forth
and
a new piece of technolog, a driver can switch back
2
operating
Like the trashcan icon on your computer
without missing a beat.
system, these skeuomorphs provide users with feelings of familiarity. 53 This
field of "nostalgic design" offers developers a tool to combat systemic techno554
Designers, developlogical risk misperception and democratize technology.
emerging technoltheir
ers, and engineers alike should invest in these fields, lest
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ogy be rejected by the average consumer simply because
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3.

LibertarianPaternalismand Nudging

As this Article has shown, systemic technological risk misperception oper555
ates as a thumb on the average decisionmaker's scales. Consequently, we need
to develop principles and rules of decision-making to counterbalance our own
biases. Libertarian paternalism and nudging are a ood place to start. While some
55 6
regulations take the form of mandates and bans, which restrict choice, nudges
offer "liberty-preserving approaches that steer people in particular directions, but
5 57
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"road signs, speed bumps, disclosure of health-related or finance-related information, educational campaigns, paperwork reduction, and public warnings."

558

Done properly, nudging "should be transparent and open rather than hidden and
covert." This form of light-handed regulation is becoming more and more popular as humans are increasingly forced to interact with government. 560
In the context of emerging technology, this form of regulation allows government to guide individuals' interactions with new forms of technology while
still respecting their right to choose what is best for themselves and their families. 5 61 It is highly useful when regulating in an area of uncertainty, such as
emerging technology, because it allows for the possibility that the regulation
could be slightly misguided or even plain wrong. 5 For example, educating consumers on the costs of not adopting or underutilizing a piece of technology where
they erroneously place more trust in themselves could help individuals make better decisions. 56 We nudge car purchasers by telling them how costly a given car
may be in terms of gas mileage. 564 Why not also educate them on how costly a
human-operated car would be in terms of lives lost compared to an autonomous
one? Even after the point of sale, we could nudge users by reminding them of the
costs associated with underutilizing their technology (e.g., a warning light might
come on that says, "if you want to be seven times safer, turn on your autopilot
by pressing here"). Finally, we could adopt default rules that automatically enroll
individuals in the benefits of a given emerging technology and then allow them
to opt-out.
In the spirit of fighting fire with fire and designing more palatable technology, Al itself can nudge us into making better choices about technology. 565 It
can be trained to "to mimic the way people behave in constructive relationships." 566 In that sense, it can learn our idiosyncrasies and biases when it comes
to technology and politely nudge us in the right direction. 567 Of course, nudging
may not be the best nor the only form of regulation that could be used to counteract the average American's biases with respect to technology. But it is a good
and relatively safe place to start.
558. Id. at 584.
559. Id.
560. See id. ("All over the world, nations have become keenly interested in nudges. To take two of many
examples, the UK has a Behavioral Insights Team (sometimes called the 'Nudge Unit'), and the USA has a white
House Social and Behavioral Sciences Team. The growing interest in nudges stems from the fact that they usually
impose low (or no) costs, because they sometimes deliver prompt results (including significant economic savings), because they maintain freedom, and because they can be highly effective. In some cases, nudges have a
larger impact than more expensive and more coercive tools.").
561. See id.
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563. See Sunstein, supra note 556, at 584.
564. See Alexis C. Madrigal, New Labels Try to Nudge You to Better Fuel Economy Decisions,ATLANTIC
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565. Bob Suh, Can Al Nudge Us to Make Better Choices?, HARV. Bus. REV. (May 2, 2019), https://
hbr.org/2019/05/can-ai-nudge-us-to-make-better-choices [https://perma.cc/YT3R-FELP].
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IV. CONCLUSION

Systemic technological risk misperception is an underappreciated but increasing problem that American lawmakers and regulators must face. While the
status quo might feel comfortable, progress is critical to maintain our leadership
role on the world stage and our quality of life. When agencies allow human biases
to control technological policy and rulemaking, deaths that otherwise might have
been prevented result. Lives that otherwise might have been lifted out of poverty
continue to be left behind. Opportunities to enrich the human condition are continually put off.
But this does not have to be the case. Our biases are not a ball and chain,
and U.S. regulatory policy towards emerging technology need not be influenced
by them. The industrial and legal reforms proposed in this Article offer the
chance to protect our decision-making process from the distortionary effects of
systemic technological risk misperception.
In the end, it is no mere coincidence that many of the heuristics and biases
that drive systemic technological risk misperception have been inadvertently
codified in colloquial proverbs such as "better safe than sorry," "better the devil
you know than the one you don't," or "you can't teach an old dog new tricks."
These proverbs are simply repackaged, western manifestations of human cognition and systemic biases. For centuries, we have accepted these colloquialisms
as fact because to do otherwise would be to question the prism of human existence, something we have just recently become comfortable doing. The problem
we face now is a question of how to combat truisms that are simply not true and
how to counteract principles that are paralyzing. Simply put, how do we protect
us from ourselves?

